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INTRODUCTION 
“It has been rarely remarked how seldom a competitive spirit comes into play in 
the relations among these [Renaissance Florentine] merchants. The vast 
correspondence of Datini and of the Medici themselves (the largest collections of 
business letters to survive before the sixteenth century) yields hardly a hint of 
competition… However individualistic the Florentine world appears in contrast 
with the tight corporate structures elsewhere – the Venetian senate, the Hanseatic 
league, the south-German cartels, the London regulated companies – it was still 
permeated with something of the spirit of medieval corporatism. This is what the 
fiducia Florentine business historians make so much of really comes down to – 
that sense of trust in one another that in a way also kept everyone in line.”2 
  
 What were the social and institutional factors that led to, and reinforced, the 
precocious emergence of Florentine commercial capitalism,3 especially in the domain of 
international merchant-banking? The dominant stream of answers, emphasized by 
economic historians and by economists, focuses on the invention in late-medieval and 
Renaissance Italy of a variety of innovative business techniques – bills of exchange, 
double-entry bookkeeping, partnership contracts, commercial courts. If these impressive 
organizational inventions are interpreted as facets of a broader rise of impersonal market 
rationality, then a tension emerges in Florentine, and indeed in European, historiography 
between economic historians and the work of social and political historians, who 
emphasize the deeply personalistic – mainly familial and clientelist – character of social 
relationships of the period. But were early-capitalist business techniques really the 
leading edge of a breakthrough of the market from its traditional social shackles, as the 
master narrative of modernization would have it? Or instead were economic relations in 
the market embedded in, and hence reflective of, trends in the surrounding social and 
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political networks of the time, as anthropologically and sociologically oriented economic 
historians like Karl Polanyi4 have argued? Renaissance Florentine businessmen were not 
only businessmen, after all, they were also fathers, neighbors, politicians, friends and 
enemies, and patrons of the arts. But what implications, if any, did this overlap in roles 
have for the organization and operation of economic markets? 
 In this article, we address these historical questions through both statistical and 
textual analyses of Florentine commercial credit in the early Quattrocento. Our 
conclusion will be that commercial credits among Florentine companies were indeed 
highly correlated with a wide range of non-economic, social relationships among the 
partners of these companies. Correlations between economic and social relations were 
highest in the merchant-banking pinnacle of the Florentine economy – precisely in the 
industries where reliance upon advanced capitalist business techniques was greatest. New 
capitalist business techniques thus did not displace the oligarchic social networks of the 
time, but rather built upon and formalized these relationships into markets. In particular, 
family and neighborhood provided strong ‘traditionalist’ foundations to Renaissance 
Florentine credit markets. But then republicanism, especially in the institutional form of 
its elected city council, provided the political scaffolding for personalistic social networks 
(and thus the economic credit networks built upon them) topologically to ‘open out’ 
toward expansive liquidity and growth, instead of to close inward into cliques and 
corruption. Three mechanisms for this institutional impact of republicanism on the 
emergence of credit markets are discussed: public certification of reputation (onore) 
through co-optative elections, and both performative and network incorporations of 
carefully filtered newcomers into relatively open elites5 of merchant-politicians. 
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 We shall develop this thesis about the structure and operation of the Renaissance 
Florentine economy through the following steps: After describing our comprehensive 
quantitative data on commercial credit from the 1427 tax census (catasto), we shall first 
document the magnitude of reliance on commercial credit among Renaissance Florentine 
companies, in various industries and markets. We shall then analyze these commercial 
credits statistically, in order to measure correlations between business credits and various 
social and political relations among the partners of paired companies. Finally, a small 
sample of business letters from the period will be examined in order to illustrate the 
cultural mentalité through which these statistical effects were produced. Florentine 
businessmen’s frequent use of the language of friendship (amicizia) and of honor (onore) 
in their letters to each other illustrates both how the language of social obligation deeply 
infused their economic relations, and how business credit (in parallel to political 
clientage) expanded the range of application of such personalistic mental models well 
beyond the family and neighborhood social matrices of their origins. We conclude with 
some implications for contemporary economic theory. 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF FLORENTINE COMMERCIAL CREDIT 
The statistical part of this study is possible because of the 1427 catasto or tax 
census, described at length in the path breaking book of David Herlihy and Christiane 
Klapisch-Zuber.6 Herlihy and Klapisch computerized large portions of this rich archival 
source and analyzed their data primarily from a demographic and family-history 
perspective. In addition to the data those authors coded, however, the catasto also 
contains extensive lists of debtors and creditors, with amounts owed, for each household 
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tax return, which McLean has coded.7 Business debitori and creditori were included 
within the household tax return of the lead partner in the company – an indicator of the 
incomplete separation of personal and business domains in the Florentine world. Such 
lists of debts existed in the catasto because this very innovative taxation procedure 
systematically assessed taxes on the basis of net wealth – that is, assets minus liabilities. 
Debts, in other words, were tax deductible. Florentine law required the itemization of 
outstanding credits as well as debts in order to give tax officials the ability to disallow 
deductions, if one person’s declared debit did not equal the other person’s declared credit. 
This remarkable breakthrough in public finance was possible only because of the 
highly commercialized character of Florence’s underlying economy. Florentine 
merchants filled out the business parts of their 1427 tax returns by copying summaries of 
their account books into their tax declaration, as those account books existed as of the 
date of the tax submission. Later catasti in Florence became notoriously unreliable, but 
this first catasto seems to have been fairly accurate in the financial data it contained.8 
Hence the 1427 catasto provides a high-resolution snapshot of the credits and debits of 
the entire Florentine economy at one specific, fleeting moment in time. Virtually all of 
the account books, out of which this information originally was drawn, subsequently have 
been lost.9 This Florentine source therefore is remarkable: no other comparably 
comprehensive data set about economic transactions exists for so early in modern or pre-
modern history.10 
 The details of our coding of these creditori lists were reported in a previous 
publication; hence that description will not be repeated here.11 Both business and 
personal debts were coded, even though only business debits and credits will be analyzed 
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in this article. The main coding rules relevant to this article were these: only debts of 
value greater than or equal to 10 florins were coded, and only debts to other Florentines 
were coded. An effect of the first coding rule is mostly to exclude artisans from our data 
set. An effect of the second coding rule is that trading among Florentines (even when 
they were resident abroad) is the focus of the data set, rather than trading between 
Florentines and foreigners. The joint effect of both constraints is that the data describe, 
with great richness, the structure of the export-oriented segment12 of the Florentine 
economy, as of 1427. This was the core of the Florentine economy, including both 
merchant-bankers and cloth manufacturers. 
 Within these constraints, coverage is thorough. Numerous passes through the 
catasto were performed, in order to code a high percentage of companies’ accounts or 
bilanci. Ultimately, 65.4% of the bilanci of active companies in our core industries were 
coded. Comprehensive coding was least successful for international merchant companies 
located abroad,13 for small low-quality wool companies whose accounts were hardest to 
distinguish from the credits and debits of the household, and for a number of companies 
who were connected to the export-oriented sector but were not formally located within 
any of the key industries we targeted. For Florence- and Pisa-based banks, merchants, 
merchant-banks, silk manufacturing, high-quality wool manufacturing, and cloth-retail 
companies, the bilanci coding rate approached 80%. Debts were coded not among a 
predefined list of all companies (which list did not exist until this study), but rather 
among all companies and people meeting the above standards. As a result of our 
procedure of coding credits to Florentine companies outside of previously coded bilanci, 
however, even the debits of companies whose accounts were not coded directly often 
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were found indirectly in the credit accounts of coded companies. Because of such cross-
referencing, we were able to compile, for the first time, a complete census of companies 
active in the year 1427. A tabulation of this census, industry by industry, is presented in 
table 1. The detailed list of the companies underlying table 1 is publicly available on 
Padgett’s web page: http://home.uchicago.edu/~jpadgett. 
-- table 1 about here -- 
We estimate, through procedures explained in an earlier version of this article14 
that 33.4% of the total number of all debits and credits of companies participating in the 
export-oriented industries of the Florentine economy were finally included in our data 
set. And we estimate that 62.3% of the total monetary value of all such debits and credits 
are included in our data set.15 
 The first stage in our analysis is descriptive: How important was commercial 
credit to the Renaissance Florentine economy? In which markets did it figure most 
centrally? In what types of economic exchanges was credit used? What was the ratio of 
transactional to (multi-transactional) relational credit in various markets? 
One common way in finance of measuring the magnitude of credit is leverage: the 
ratio of outstanding debt to assets. The higher the ratio, the more important is credit in the 
operation of the company. Higher leverage can generate higher profits, but at greater 
economic risk. ‘Assets’ in the Florentine context primarily means the startup capital 
specified in the partnership contract, called corpo. Table 2 reports leverage so defined, 
and it also provides two more liberal definitions of ‘assets’, which progressively add to 
corpo the partners’ reinvestments of past profit and company inventory.16  
-- table 2 about here -- 
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 Using the strict definition of leverage, our findings are that Florentine merchant-
banks were leveraged on average at 5:1 of their corpo; that Florentine cloth retail and 
dyeing companies were leveraged at a little over 2:1 of their corpo; and that Florentine 
cloth production companies, wool and silk, were leveraged at about 1:1 of their corpo. 
These leverage ratios are not really comparable to modern figures, because modern firms 
borrow for the most part from specialized banks, whereas these companies borrowed for 
the most part from their trading and exchange partners. Nonetheless, the ordering of these 
ratios is consistent with the known facts that merchant-banks were generally more 
profitable as personal investments, but also more risky, than were wool and silk 
production companies.17 In general, it is fair to say that virtually all Florentine 
companies, but especially merchant-banks, were highly leveraged and that most of their 
business was conducted on credit. 
On average, larger and wealthier companies operated on higher leverage than did 
smaller companies.18 The most extreme example in our data set was Cosimo de’ Medici’s 
bank branch in Rome, which had the highest outstanding debt of any company in 
Florence, yet its startup capital was zero, generating a leverage ratio of infinity.19 Such an 
extreme case makes it clear that name, reputation, and connections were more central in 
the generation of commercial credit in fifteenth-century Florence than were economic 
assets, narrowly defined as security. Given the pervasiveness of doing business on credit, 
without other firms being willing to extend credit to a given firm, that firm could not 
really be in business at all.20 This was the mechanism that “kept everyone in line.” 
 Figure 1, in the on-line electronic version of this article, presents a computerized 
visualization of our commercial credit data, using a network visualization program called 
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Pajek. Figure 2 visualizes these company-credit data differently, as Leontief input-output 
flows of credit between and within industries. In particular, figure 2 shows observed 
deviations of credit flows from randomly expected credit flows, the latter calculated on 
the basis of aggregate volumes of industry credit alone. Four specific trading patterns are 
worth highlighting in this global macroeconomic picture of inter-industry credit flow: 
(a) Credit flow among merchant-banks of all three sorts (Florentine merchant-
banks located in foreign countries, Florentine merchant trading companies 
located in Pisa, and domestic banks and merchant-banks located in Florence) 
was massive. Metaphorically speaking, the merchant-banking sector was a 
whirlwind of products, bills of exchange, and credits cycling around. 
(b) Woolen-cloth consignments, from woolen-cloth manufacturers (lanaiuoli), 
flowed more to local cloth retailers (ritagliatori) in 1427 than to merchant-
bankers.21 
(c) Silk-cloth consignments, from silk-cloth manufacturers (setaiuoli), flowed 
more to merchant-bankers in 1427 than to local cloth retailers.22 In reverse 
direction, setaiuoli received a higher flow of credits (including raw silk) from 
domestic merchant-banks, relative to statistical expectation, than did 
lanaiuoli.23 
(d) Silk firms in 1427 exchanged with and gave credit to each other, whereas 
wool firms for the most part did not. 
-- figure 2 about here -- 
Credit pattern (a) documents statistically the observation of Goldthwaite in the 
opening quotation that Florentine merchant-banks were not an industry of independent 
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firms in competition. They were instead a cooperative banking and trading network 
system, with ‘competing’ merchant-bankers providing much liquidity and business to 
each other. This is the central economic fact that we seek to understand.24 
Credit/trade patterns (b), (c) and (d) reflect recent trends in the Florentine 
economy in the early fifteenth century. The core of the Florentine economy in the 
fourteenth century had been the finishing, production, and export of woolen cloth. In the 
late 1200s and early 1300s, Florentine merchant-bankers in the Calimala guild imported 
unfinished cloth from Flanders and exported finished and dyed woolen cloth. By the mid 
1300s, Florentine merchant-bankers in the Cambio and other guilds imported raw wool 
and exported completely manufactured woolen cloth. The Florentine wool-production 
industry, however, suffered serious and protracted contraction between 1373 and 1437, 
due primarily to aggressive expansion of woolen cloth production in England.25 The raw-
material flow of prized English wool, upon which the high-end San Martino segment of 
woolen cloth production in Florence had depended, diminished, forcing a higher 
percentage of production of lower-quality woolen cloth, called garbo. The San Martino 
woolen cloth still left was sold both to merchant-bankers – especially those with 
warehouses in Pisa – and to ritagliatori, whereas garbo woolen cloth in this period was 
sold overwhelmingly to ritagliatori.26  
The Florentine merchant community and government, under the political control 
of the popolani-based Albizzi oligarchy at the time, responded to this economic crisis by 
trying aggressively to develop silk-cloth production,27 in order to substitute for declining 
woolen-cloth production. The mechanism of this sponsorship was liberal credit and 
investment from upper-class merchant-bankers to new-men silk manufacturers.28 
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Woolen-cloth production still exceeded the newer silk-cloth production in total volume, 
and also in total employment, but our data show that this centrally encouraged industrial 
transformation from wool to silk was well underway in 1427. The credit mechanisms 
analyzed in this article help to explain how the Florentine economy successfully adapted 
to its challenging international situation.29 
 What was the transactional content of the cross-industry company-credit flow 
depicted in figure 2? Table 3 provides information about the specific goods funded 
through credits, broken down by aggregated industrial clusters and by transactional 
versus relational credits, to be explained shortly. Unfortunately only 11% of our credits 
had their content or purpose listed in the catasto. No doubt all of these purposes were 
described in detail in the original account books, but there was no tax reason for 
businessmen or their accountants to copy this text into their summary tax returns. 
Nonetheless, even an 11% sample gives an adequate picture, as long as one is content 
with coarse-grained resolution. 
-- table 3 about here -- 
 The modal activities reported in table 3 are what any knowledgeable historian 
would expect. Namely, among merchant-banks, the modal type of credit was the current 
account (conto corrente). In these cases, a single recorded “credit” in the tax returns 
summarized many underlying business transactions.30 As per their monikers, merchant-
banks engaged in both merchant and banking activity, hence the content of these 
transactions was diverse. But the primary international banking transaction was the bill of 
exchange.31 As such, bills of exchange were transactions, and conti correnti were the 
formalized economic relations containing these and other transactions. Between 
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merchant-banks and other companies, the primary credit activity was trading raw material 
for cloth on consignment. Banking services also were provided on credit by merchant-
bankers to textile producers. Accounts called conti di esercizio orchestrated recurrent 
trade among such trading partners.32 Conti di esercizio between merchant-bankers and 
textile manufacturers were not as common as were conti correnti between merchant-
bankers. Among other mostly cloth-producing companies, the modal credit activity was 
lending raw materials and cloth to each other, on a transactional basis. 
 ‘Current accounts’ and ‘accounts of use’ were the accounting vessels that 
contained and measured strong economic credit relationships among Florentine 
companies. Double-entry bookkeeping slowly percolated throughout northern Italy 
during the first half of the fourteenth century, but it became widespread in Florence only 
in the late fourteenth century.33 Bilateral format in Florentine merchant account books – 
the physical layout of the pages often associated34 with double-entry bookkeeping – 
became widespread in the 1380s, precisely in conjunction with the invention and rapid 
diffusion of the partnership system.35 From the point of view of credit, the most 
significant aspect of that accounting change is its instantiation of the current account,36 
which visually was displayed so neatly in bilateral-format pages. Simplifying a bit,37 to 
open up an account book in bilateral format was to place into clear sight the writer’s own 
economic relationship with a single person or company. Credits (both monetary amounts 
and descriptions of content) between the writer and that person or company were listed 
on one side of the open account book, and debts of the writer with that same person or 
company on the facing page. Such accounts usually were initiated with an opening 
deposit or a credit of some sort, but after that initiation a whole series of transactions 
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ensued, with accounting money (not necessarily physical money38) flowing both in and 
out, all registered neatly and precisely in parallel columns. Earlier more primitive single-
entry account books, in contrast, were registers of the writer’s transactions, ordered by 
date irrespective of alter, each described in paragraphs with complicated systems of 
cross-reference to help figure out whether the credit was ever repaid.39 To put this 
accounting development simply: the foundational organizing unit of single-entry 
bookkeeping was the transaction, while the organizing unit of bilateral double-entry 
bookkeeping was the economic relationship.40 Conti correnti between merchant-bankers 
and conti di esercizio between merchants and manufacturers were the most advanced 
technical means in Florence through which economic credits were managed. 
At the international level, where different currencies were involved, current 
accounts could become quite complex, internally differentiating into four separate 
financial components: nostro/our and vostro/your accounts for each merchant-banking 
side of the ongoing economic relation.41 Essentially paired companies began to maintain 
complementary and quasi-permanent ‘bins’ within each other into which their credits and 
debts could be transferred at will on an ongoing basis. Such networks of open-ended 
credit involved both partnership systems, with legally separate branches linked through 
common partners, and separately owned companies who did frequent business with each 
other – so-called corrispondenti. In our section on business letters, we shall have 
occasion to see corrispondenti relations more closely in action.  
Anticipating the statistical results of next section about social embeddedness, we 
point out here that paired current accounts, implementing corrispondenti relations, are 
not inconsistent in form from reciprocity in anthropological social exchange.42 Both in 
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primitive social exchange and in the mathematically sophisticated conti correnti, one 
party offers a ‘gift’ to the other, thereby ‘making’ or constructing that person (or his 
business), and is repaid not by cash but by reciprocal gifts, which thereby ‘make’ in turn 
the initiating person (or his business). A credit or loan, in this social-exchange 
understanding, is just an unreciprocated gift. Much recurrent business was conducted by 
Florentine companies in this open-ended gift-exchange manner of reciprocity, without 
requiring cash,43 even though of course serious risks of bad debts and cheating were 
incurred thereby. 
By pointing out the homology between early-capitalist and traditional social 
exchange, we are not claiming that Renaissance Florence was no different from New 
Guinea. The level of mathematical sophistication is vastly different. But we are claiming 
that, despite the absence of personal information in Florentine account books, many of 
these accounts (particularly the most elaborate of them) represented the formalization of 
personal relations, not their displacement by impersonal relations. Sometimes the social 
preceded in time the development of the economic relation; sometimes the economic 
preceded in time the development of the social; but either way economic and social 
relational logics had a strong tendency to bleed into each other in Renaissance Florentine 
markets.44     
An important subsidiary message in table 3 about exchange content is its 
diversity. We have tabulated on the right-hand column of table 3 the dispersion of 
multiple credits across content categories, between specific exchange partners, in those 
pairs of companies where we were lucky enough to have more than one instance of 
content reported. With the exception of trading among cloth producers and ritagliatori, 
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which was fairly specialized in character, the goods and services exchanged among 
merchant-banks and between merchant-banks and other companies were remarkably 
wide ranging in content. In recurrent exchange relationships between Florentine 
companies, merchant activities, banking activities and account activities (which really 
could cover anything: merchandise, bills of exchange, even daughters’ dowries) were all 
mixed up. While distinct in terms of guild membership, therefore, upper-tier Florentine 
companies were not sharply specialized in terms of actual exchange behavior. On the 
margins, Florentine industries blended into one another, with a single company quite 
capable of morphing its business into another ‘industry’.45 Such company plasticity, we 
believe, was a macro-industrial-structure consequence of the generalist social exchange 
instantiated (and precisely measured) within conti correnti and conti di esercizio. 
 Motivated by our knowledge of current accounts, in table 4 we move on to 
disaggregate overall credit flows into transactional and relational credits. “Relational 
credits” we define as credits between companies who had more than one cross-sectionally 
observed credit between them. “Transactional credits,” in complement, are those credits 
between companies who had only one observed credit between them.46 Relational credits 
in turn are of two types: (a) reciprocal credits, where credits flowed in both directions, 
and (b) multiple credits, where more than one outstanding credit existed in a single 
direction. Reciprocal credits are our observable proxies for corrispondenti relationships.47  
-- table 4 about here -- 
It is not correct to interpret relational credits as “personal” and transactional 
credits as “impersonal,” because any credit at all implies that the creditor knew the debtor 
at least well enough to judge him credit-worthy. But relational credits go beyond mere 
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knowledge of credit-worthiness to connote a social relationship of trust. “Multiple 
credits” either means extending to someone a second (or more) credit even before they 
have paid off their first debt, or it means maintaining multiple accounts with the other. 
Some sort of trust in or deep character assessment of the debtor by the creditor seems 
virtually a prerequisite for this intense a level of repeated lending behavior.  
Reciprocity epitomizes the anthropological logic of social exchange, discussed 
above, in which ‘gifts’ flow open-endedly back and forth between the exchange parties, 
both in order to create social obligations and in order economically to help to ‘make’ 
each other. It is notable in the Florentine case that such credits flowed back and forth (for 
example, two credits one way and three credits the other way), without them being 
aggregated into a net balance (for example, into one net credit owed). Each credit account 
ultimately had to be cleared separately, even if not necessarily in cash. Sometimes in our 
data reciprocal credits occurred through two-way transactions being itemized and 
recorded individually, but more commonly they occurred through paired current accounts 
that each party held in the books of the other, as has already been mentioned.  
 Within the high-volume merchant-banking sector, table 4 shows that 45% of the 
credits in our data were reciprocal credits, that 50% of the credits were multiple credits, 
and that 63% of the credits were relational credits of either version. Relational exchange, 
in other words, was fundamental to the operation of Florentine merchant-banks. 
 Between banks and other companies, and among other companies, the proportion 
of total credits in relational form was not as high as it was among merchant-banks 
themselves, but it was still substantial. 33% of the credits in our data between banks and 
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other companies were relational credits, and 29% of the credits among non-bank 
companies were relational in character. 
By these measures, credits within merchant-banking industries were on average 
more ‘personal’, both in relational-credit style and in embedding in non-economic social 
networks (see below), than were credits involving the textile-manufacturing and cloth-
retail industries. Relational credit was the non-specialized social-exchange logic through 
which the highest volume of Florentine commercial credit flowed, precisely recorded in 
account books through conti correnti and conti di esercizio. Regardless of whether credit 
was relational or transactional, however, commercial credit was crucial to the operation 
of all advanced sectors of the Renaissance Florentine economy. 
 
STATISICAL ANALYSIS OF FLORENTINE COMMERCIAL CREDIT 
 Florentine businessmen were not just businessmen. They were also fathers, 
brothers, neighbors, in-laws, republican office-holders, faction fighters, humanists, and 
patrons of the arts. The colloquialism “Renaissance man” reflects the Florentine social 
reality that the intellectual, economic, and political activities of its elite merchant-
republicans were remarkably diverse.48 Among their many activities, the pursuit of 
business did not necessarily assume first place in their career ambitions or in their 
biographies. The average number of years that a Florentine banker was actually doing 
banking was only 8.2 years.49 Success in business often was a stepping stone toward 
other elite activities, like becoming a city councilor, an ambassador, a rentier, or even an 
art patron or humanist scholar.50 Cosimo de’ Medici was not unique in this regard. In 
such a social context, it should come as no surprise that “there is scant reason to expect 
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that Renaissance economic exchanges, occurring within dense and multi-textured social 
networks, to lack broader cultural meanings shared by other Renaissance exchange 
systems: gift giving, hospitality, the exchange of greetings, or the exchange of women.”51 
The strategic implication of this dense social-network overlap is that “single actions [such 
as the granting of business credit] are moves in many games at once.”52 
Renaissance Florence was not a large city by modern standards – in 1427 only 
37,246 people.53 Thus most Florentine businessmen knew much about each other, both in 
business and outside of business, if only through reputation. Even were a Florentine 
businessman to desire to shut the doors of his office and to withdraw from the inquiring 
eyes of the social networks around him,54 reputation and the subsequent flow of business 
credit and business opportunities would force him to stop that, or else he would fail in his 
business. In this section, we shall analyze more specifically exactly which social 
networks were important for which commercial credit behaviors in which industries. 
In statistical analyses to follow, the commercial credits already described will 
become the dependent variables. For social-context independent variables, Padgett and 
his assistants have collected and computerized a wide variety of primary-source and 
secondary-source data about the attributes and networks of these businessmen and 
others:55 namely, patrilineage,56 marriage,57 neighborhood,58 personal wealth,59 political 
office-holding,60 voting,61 social-class membership,62 and factional affiliation.63 These 
data will be used to reconstruct the “dense and multitextured social network” context 
within which Florentine commercial credit operated. 
 In an appendix in the on-line version of this article, we present our full logit-
regression statistical analyses of commercial credits among our 1427 companies, using 
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various social attributes and social networks of the Florentine partners who owned them 
as independent variables. For each separate market, logit regressions were run on 
dichotomized credits as dependent variables64 – first for all commercial credits, and then 
for credits subdivided into reciprocal-credit and asymmetric-credit65 subsets. In the 
interest of saving publication space, we extract only salient statistically significant 
coefficients from that more complete appendix to present in table 5. Asterisks in the table 
refer to degrees of statistical significance.66 Details on variable construction are presented 
both in the on-line appendix and in table 5. 
 -- table 5 about here -- 
For those readers who do not consult the full appendix, it is important to note that 
more variables were included in the full logit regressions than have been extracted to 
highlight in table 5. As statistical controls, five variables were included to correct for 
tautologies and sample biases in the data: (a) baseline null expectations of numbers of 
credits between companies, based on the sizes of the companies alone,67 (b) two dummy 
variables for whether company accounts were coded directly from the catasto or were 
inferred indirectly from trading partners’ accounts, and (c) the total taxable personal 
wealth of all partners in creditor companies and in debtor companies, as reported in the 
catasto. Not surprisingly the first three of these control variables were almost always 
statistically significant. In addition, eight other substantive variables were analyzed but 
are not reported in table 5, because we failed to find more than random68 statistical 
significance in their estimated coefficients: namely, (a) neighborhood at the coarse-
grained level of quarter (above and beyond the more fine-grained gonfaloni), (b) three 
social-class endogamy variables (percentage ‘upper class’ popolani and magnate 
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partners, percentage ‘middle class’ new-men and new-new-men partners, and percentage 
‘lower class’ families-never-admitted-to-Priorate partners), and (c) four political offices 
other than Priorate or city council – namely, the Buonuomini (or dodici), the Gonfalonieri 
(or seidici), the guild consuls, and members of the Mercanzia or commercial court. It is 
therefore a substantive finding, albeit a negative one, that quarter, social class,69 and 
political offices other than Priorate did not consistently affect commercial credit in 1427. 
A ninth variable not included in table 5 – namely in-law marriage among partners in 
different companies – was frequently statistically significant, but that is not highlighted 
because the number of documented partners across different companies who were direct 
in-laws, at the nuclear family level, was quite small.70 Finally, the cluster option within 
STATA’s logit-regression procedure was employed, using company ID as the fine-
grained categorical variable, in order to control for potentially important missing factors 
for which we do not have data.71 
 To facilitate later comparison with business letters, the findings in table 5 will be 
discussed within categories that our Florentines would understand – namely famiglia, 
amicizia, onore, and finally partnership systems. 
Famiglia: 
 Instead of taking an essentialist position on the historiographically sensitive 
question of what was the Florentine family,72 we chose to measure this four ways and “let 
the data decide.” Two companies were measured to have a “nuclear family” relation with 
each other by the percentage that partners in the two different companies were members 
of the same nuclear family (that is, father and sons, or brothers). Two companies were 
measured to have a “patrilineage family” relation by the percentage that partners in the 
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two companies were members of the same patrilineage, above and beyond nuclear family 
(that is, cousins or uncles with same last name). Two companies were measured to have 
an “in-law” relation by the percentage that one set of partners married into the nuclear 
families of the other set. And two companies were measured to have a “parentado 
family” relation by the percentage that one set of partners had the same last names as the 
other set of  partners’ wives.  
 Not very surprisingly, family relations among partners in different companies, 
when they were present, exerted frequent and strong effects on those companies’ credit 
behavior toward each other. Indeed pooling across the three ways of running the 
regressions (namely, all credits, reciprocal credits, and asymmetric credits) reveals the 
relative frequency of “family” statistical effects to be rank ordered in the intuitive way – 
namely, nuclear family (14 significant coefficients) >  patrilineage family (7 significant 
coefficients) > parentado family (5 significant coefficients).73 All versions of Florentine 
“family,” in other words, affected Florentine commercial behavior. 
These statistical effects are not surprising because when family relations 
interpenetrated commercial relations, credit exchanges between companies became as 
much social obligations as economic investments. “Social obligations enforcing 
economic investments” or “economic investments enacting social obligations”: either 
way of interpreting the empirical correlation is consistent with our data. Thus insisting on 
the causal priority of one side over the other is probably a mistake. We shall see in our 
business letters that even non-kin sometimes evoked fictional-kinship language with each 
other, which strengthened the obligatory connotations of economic exchange. In all 
 22
domains, not excluding the economic, kinship was central in Renaissance Florentine 
thinking and behavior. 
While true in almost74 all Florentine markets, there is a remarkable density of nine 
significant family coefficients in the four reciprocal-credit markets involving 
international merchant-bankers. Reciprocal credits are our observable proxies for 
corrispondenti relations, often implemented through paired conti correnti. When 
Florentine businessmen were resident outside of their native soil, they relied even more 
than they did otherwise on family as the social ligaments upon which they constructed 
their corrispondenti. Apparently in their most risky business climates, Florentines tended 
to close ranks within intimate social relations for their deepest credit connections. Since 
Florentine families in international business were spread geographically all over Europe, 
some of the heaviest early fifteenth-century flow of international finance throughout  
Europe coursed through upper-class75 Florentine families’ veins, making them very 
wealthy indeed.76  
Amicizia: 
Our imperfect proxy for ‘friends’ is ‘neighbors’. We acknowledge the 
imperfection of the match, but neighbors are measurable in our data whereas friends are 
not. The social intimacy of Florentine neighborhoods has been documented extensively in 
the literature,77 so the assumption is well grounded that neighborhood was highly 
correlated with social-interaction frequency, even though close interaction could lead to 
hostility as well to friendship within neighborhoods.78 
Gonfaloni were the sixteen administrative districts or wards into which Florence 
was divided geographically. We measured a “same gonfalone” relationship between 
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companies as the percentage of times that the partners in two different companies lived in 
the same gonfalone. “Same quarter” (excluding same gonfalone) relations were measured 
similarly. 
The statistical findings regarding “same gonfalone” are remarkably sharp: At very 
high significance levels, markets involving domestic merchant-banks, resident in 
Florence, almost always relied on neighborhood socially to structure their commercial 
credit relations. Put simply, Florentine banks and merchant-banks resident in Florence 
disproportionately extended commercial credit to those wool-manufacturing companies, 
silk-manufacturing companies, international merchant-banks, and other domestic banks 
and merchant-banks, whose partners lived in the same gonfaloni as partners of the focal 
company. We interpret this as amicizia. Whereas Florentine international merchant-
banking business was organized substantially through family relations, Florentine 
domestic-banking business was organized substantially through friends. As was the case 
with the association between family and international corrispondenti, moreover, domestic 
merchant-bankers and their recurrent exchange partners frequently referred to each other 
in business letters as friends, whether or not they ‘really’ were. Causality went as much 
from business to friends as it did from friends to business.79 
 In another article,80 Padgett has demonstrated that the effect of neighborhood on 
marriage, while always statistically significant, declined in absolute importance from 
1300 to 1500. Whether a similar temporal decline in Florence was true for economic 
credit cannot be assessed with data on 1427. 
Onore: 
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 The Italian word onore means both “honor” and “political office,” reflecting the 
historical reality in Italian republics that to be elected to a public office was conceived to 
be an honor, bespeaking respect from one’s fellow citizens. Office-holding in the 
Florentine republic was not a matter for professional politicians. Many normal ‘amateur’, 
but respected and articulate, citizens were elected to serve short stints81 in Florentine 
public office, taking temporary and unpaid time out from their normal business or other 
pursuits. It is surprising to modern eyes to see how anxious and honored Florentine 
republican citizens were to be elected by their social superiors and peers to high political 
office, with no overt reward or payment other than prestige.82 
 As mentioned above, no political office other than the top office – namely, the 
Priorate or city council – had consistent statistical effects on commercial-credit behavior 
among Florentine companies. But republican service in this very top office of Priorate, 
measured as percentage of both companies’ partners serving in the Priorate prior to 1427, 
had frequent and strong consequences for commercial credit in all markets involving 
domestic merchant-banks.83 This was especially true for reciprocal credits, but it was true 
also for all credits and for asymmetric credits as well. In this regard the variable 
“Priorate” behaved statistically just like “same gonfaloni.” In addition to amicizia, the 
social logic of onore, conceptualized as personal honor but manifest as republican office-
holding, was at the core of commercial credit among companies dealing with merchant-
banks resident in Florence. 
 The concentration of strong statistical Priorate effects on commercial credit 
especially in markets related to domestic banking and to domestic merchant-banking 
makes sense. Florentine international merchant-bankers were scattered all over Europe, 
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far away from Priorate service back home. And the density of social ties observing and 
calibrating onore, measured in scrutiny voting, was higher at home in Florence than it 
was abroad. Public reputation could not really be ignored anywhere, but it was especially 
salient and observable at home. 
 It has been shown previously that political office-holding had effects on business 
and wealth, via state finance, at the very highest echelons of the elite.84 However, this is 
the first demonstration of a pervasive office-holding effect on business throughout wide 
segments of Florentine society. Perhaps this widespread causal effect is related to the fact 
that eligibility for the Priorate had increased substantially from 1343 to 1427.85 
 In table 5, we also report statistical results for scrutiny voting and for political 
factions. Scrutiny voting in 1433, measured as the votes received by the sum of the 
highest vote receivers in each company, had numerous statistical effects on commercial 
credit in 1427, but these effects were scattered among international and domestic 
merchant-banking markets. Likewise factional membership in the Medici and Albizzi 
parties of 1433 had numerous statistical effects on commercial credit in 1427, but these 
also were scattered among merchant-banking markets. These independent variables from 
1433 were included to predict dependent-variable outcomes in 1427 under the 
presumption of stability in political attitudes over time. The lack of clear market 
patterning may be related to this empirically unavoidable slipperiness in dates.  
At the very least, we can conclude that “politics mattered” in economic credit 
markets in 1427. It is even clearer that “economics mattered” in the early 1430’s 
construction of the Medici political party or faction.86 In Renaissance Florence, 
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commercial behavior, especially in merchant-banking, was no more segregated from 
political partisanship than it was from kinship or friendship or republican office-holding. 
 
Partnership systems: 
 The partnership system was a new organizational form in the history of financial 
capitalism, invented in Renaissance Florence.87 Partnership systems were sets of legally 
autonomous companies, with their own account books, linked in ownership through 
single persons or through a holding company of controlling partners. Usually, though not 
necessarily, the linked companies in question were diversified across industries, with 
international merchant-banks and domestic merchant-banks dominating in number, and 
with domestic merchant-banks serving as the managerial headquarters. Padgett and 
McLean (2006) documented the rapid diffusion of this organizational form, after its 
Ciompi-revolt induced birth in 1383. 
Table 5 reveals strong credit interconnections in 1427 among companies linked in 
partnership systems throughout the merchant-banking sector and occasionally in other 
sectors as well. This is not surprising, for companies linked through common owners 
presumably were ordered to cooperate, even though they were legally autonomous.88 In 
addition, within the domestic-banking industry, partnership systems themselves 
cooperated strongly and significantly among each other through reciprocal credits. This 
demonstrates coordination among titular ‘competitors’ at the very apex of the Florentine 
economy. Senior-partner leaders of these partnership systems became captains of finance 
in Florence, monitoring and managing large credit flows across multiple markets through 
their visible hands. 
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Unlike had been the case before the Ciompi revolt by lower-class wool workers in 
1378, international and domestic merchant-banking industries became organizationally 
interconnected through this innovative organizational mechanism of the diversified 
partnership system. Such concentration of ownership of multiple companies into fewer 
hands is hard to understand without placing it into its political context: namely, the 
consolidation of a city-wide oligarchy among elite Florentine merchant-republicans, in 
response to the Ciompi revolt.89 Economic market restructuring through partnership 
systems was one aspect of this broader political and social transformation in elite 
structure. Through this elite-transformation process, economic partnership systems took 
their place among the social-network constituents of that elite, transforming merchants on 
the one side and republicans on the other even more deeply into multi-faceted merchant-
republicans. 
Volume of social-context effects: 
 Statistical significance is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for assessing the 
volume of any factor’s impact. “Nuclear family,” for example, frequently exerted a 
significant impact on companies’ commercial credit to each other, when such close 
family relations linked those companies. But there are not really enough brothers to go 
around to organize an entire credit market. Table 6, therefore, reports the percentage of 
commercial credits affected by the significant social-context variables reported in table 5. 
We report volume only for markets involving merchant-banks, because retail ritagliatori 
markets were shown in table 5 mostly to have operated “impersonally,” that is, 
independently of our social-context variables. 
-- table 6 about here -- 
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 Firstly, the “All [variables] together” column on the right-hand side of table 6 
reinforces our interpretation of reciprocal credits as social exchange. In merchant-
banking markets (except for “International M-B / Silk”), from 42% to 96% of reciprocal 
commercial credits were rooted in “dense and multi-textured social networks.” 
Reciprocal credits were the inner skeleton of merchant-banking markets in Renaissance 
Florence, and these were constructed largely out of social-network materials. 
 Secondly, non-reciprocal or asymmetric credits were on the whole not as socially 
embedded as were reciprocal credits. But in two out of three markets internal to the 
merchant-banking sector, they were: 76% and 89% of the non-reciprocated commercial 
credits in the “Domestic M-B / International M-B” market and in the “among Domestic 
M-Bs” market could be correlated with measurable social contexts, respectively.  
Putting both the reciprocal and the non-reciprocal sides together, the global 
economic-network portrait that emerges is roughly one of concentric circles: (a) within 
the Florentine export-oriented economy as a whole, the merchant-banking sector was the 
credit core (see figure 1), (b) within the merchant-banking sector itself, reciprocal credits, 
often instantiated in corrispondenti relations, were the credit core (see tables 4 and 6), 
and (c) reciprocal credits, in turn, were built upon social-network foundations (see table 
5). Conversely, as one moved away from the merchant-banking inner core of the 
Florentine economy, out toward its ritagliatori periphery, commercial credit relations 
became more non-reciprocal and “impersonal,” in the sense of not having correlations 
with observable other social networks. In general, the Florentine economy was socially 
embedded. But more specifically Florentine merchant-banks – in their commercial 
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relations both with each other and with other companies – were embedded in, and 
regulated by, the social networks of a politically open republican oligarchy. 
Even in 1427, Florentine commercial credit markets stood very firmly on the 
‘late-medieval’ social foundations of family and neighborhood. Yet two ‘Renaissance’ 
institutional innovations – partnership systems and republican electoral reforms – pushed 
families and neighborhoods into greater network intercalation with each other, at least 
within the political reggimento,90 thereby spanning previous deep cleavages and divides. 
The complementary consequences of this increased social-network connectivity were 
greater liquidity in credit markets91 and greater elite consolidation in politics.92 
 At the elite pinnacle of the economy, diversified partnership systems bridged not 
families but industries. This new post-1383 type of Florentine economic network 
emerged out of political reaction to the Ciompi revolt, and breached the previously sharp 
segregation of business partnerships into distinct guilds.93 At the micro level of 
organizational role, senior partners in partnership systems evolved from being primarily 
industry-specific entrepreneurs into being primarily cross-industry financiers.94  
Republicanism did not affect the organization of Florentine credit markets in as 
direct a way as did partnership systems. But ex-members of the city council provided a 
pool of highly respected citizens, certified95 to have honor (onore). Such persons were a 
filtered subset of citizens whose past behavior was judged to be exemplary, as citizens 
but also, as we shall see in the Dati example below, as businessmen. They were elected in 
the first place because they were deeply enmeshed in Florentine networks and institutions 
– hardly the types to cut and run. Arguably such electoral filtering became stronger on the 
individualistic and elite defined grounds of “character” after the post-Ciompi electoral 
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reforms than before, when voting had been based more on group membership.96 Of 
course, being a good citizen was not necessarily the same thing as being a reliable 
businessman. But our modernist distinction between generalist ‘honor’ or ‘character’ and 
economically specialized ‘credit worthiness’ was not one that the Florentines shared. For 
them, a person was worthy of credit, economic or social, because he was honorable.97  
 In addition to its public certification function, republican election into the 
reggimento provided direct-access benefits to budding businessmen: (a) linguistic 
performance in verbally oriented political councils increased the level of direct 
observation that merchant-republicans had of each other, and (b) indirect introductions, 
recommendations, and gossip about reputation functioned far more efficiently within the 
republican elite than outside it. Thus although the direct material rewards for 
businessmen joining the Priorate were non-existent, the indirect payoffs were substantial 
for Florentine businessmen trying to operate in commercial credit markets. 
 A dramatic example of this Florentine link between economic credit and 
republican election is provided in the diary of Gregorio Dati, edited by Gene Brucker. 
Goro Dati was one of the successful, new-man silk merchants in our 1427 data set, but 
earlier in 1408, after twenty-four years of partnerships in the silk business, he suffered 
this fate: 
“As a result of the adversity which overtook us in Barcelona, and of the lawsuits 
which followed it, and of the suspicions concerning [my brother’s] ventures and 
the calumnies that were spread around, we were very short of credit. So we were 
forced to withdraw from business and collect whatever we could to pay our 
creditors, borrowing from friends and using all our ingenuity, suffering losses, 
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high interest, and expenses in order to avoid bankruptcy and shame. Although my 
partner was in favor of going bankrupt so as to avoid some losses and 
expenditures, I was resolved to face ruin rather than loss of honor.”98 
After four years of financial hardship but also of demonstrable integrity, 
“I was in debt for over 3,000 florins. That same year 1412, my name was drawn 
to be Standard-bearer of Justice, and I served in that office. That was the 
beginning of my recovery.”99  
This financial recovery through revived commercial credit was healthy enough to allow 
Dati to report a taxable wealth of 3,368 florins in the 1427 catasto.100 This placed him 
among the wealthiest 7% of Florentine households at that time, rebounding from less than 
nothing. 
 Table 6 shows that, out of all of our various social-context effects, “political 
embedding,” and in particular past Priorate membership, had the largest volume of 
impact on commercial credit. Family and neighborhood provided strong traditionalist 
foundations, upon which Florentine commercial credit could grow. Partnership systems 
newly coordinated the cross-industry apex of the commercial-credit system. But previous 
election to city council induced the broadest reach and connectivity in Florentine credit 
markets.  
One common criticism of personalistic markets is that they are inherently self-
limiting in extensibility and scale, compared to impersonal markets. This criticism has 
less force when discussing topologically open-ended social networks, like porous elites, 
than it does when discussing topologically closed and fragmented social networks, like 
families. Florentine merchant-banking credit markets were very personalistic. Yet they 
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geographically radiated all over Europe and brokered much of Europe’s international 
trade, without reliable judicial support. The organizational secret of the Florentines in 
their markets was their blending of multiple personalistic social networks into dense but 
socially open merchant-republican elites, who reciprocally offered commercial credit to 
each other, not as competitors, but as ‘honorable’ Renaissance men. Using gossip, 
ostracism and reputation to discipline their wide extension of credit to each other, such 
men “kept everyone in line” through the same “dense and multi-textured social networks” 
that had created them in the first place. 
 
BUSINESS LETTERS AND THE MENTALITÉ OF CREDIT 
 We close this article with a textual analysis of business letters from roughly our 
time period, in order to illustrate the discursive framings and the cognitive mentalité of 
the Florentine businessmen who produced the commercial-credit behavior documented 
above. Because of the importance of relational credits in our statistical analysis, we focus 
on letters between corrispondenti – that is, between legally autonomous companies that 
had extensive and recurrent two-way business with each other.101 In particular, we 
examine published business letters to and from the Francesco Datini company in Milan102 
and unpublished business letters to and from the Andrea de’ Bardi company in 
Florence.103 Other relevant sources are occasionally mentioned as well. Within this small 
sample of business letters, we highlight Florentine businessmen’s use of the language of 
friendship (amicizia) and of honor (onore) in discussing deals with each other. 
An important theoretical point in our discussion will be the two-way causal 
relationship between language and behavior: On the one hand, linguistic expressions 
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reference ‘real’ social relationships and obligations in the writers’ past experience. On the 
other hand, Florentine linguistic tropes and learned cognitive models, like ‘family’ 
(famiglia) and ‘friends’ (amici), were extended far beyond their objective references, as 
businessmen sought to frame and interpret each others’ market actions in such terms. 
This loose-coupling or ambiguity between Florentine language and behavior enabled both 
the creative construction of new social relationships104 and the creative construction of 
lies.105 On the whole, the benefits of the former apparently outweighed the correlated 
costs of the latter.106 Linguistic ambiguity was the medium through which economic and 
social relational logics bled into each other (or conversely, emerged out of each other). 
 Examples of corrispondenti relations, in Florentine businessmen’s own words, are 
these: 
“Of the affairs you still have to complete here, point yourself still towards Pisa 
with my company there, and also write often to me in Bruges, because I am going 
to live there, and in three days I am leaving here to go there. With the grace of 
God I will stay there a little while, and if there is anything I can do for you, write 
to me of it and I will do it, for you and for your whole company, as if it were for 
myself alone.”107  
 
“Anything that comes to you for us, you may commit to Paris or London, if it be 
to your own [company] there, to ours in Barcelona, in Lucca to Bartolomeo 
Belbani & co, and in Venice to the Medici: continue in this way if no one 
instructs you otherwise. We do not wish you to lend [credere] our money, nor the 
money of our company to any Venetian or Lombard, nor to Antonio Quarti & co, 
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nor to Niccolaio Tonghi, nor to Filippo Rapondi or others that might bring 
business to you from Dino Rapondi of Paris. Follow these instructions, and with 
the others [with whom you correspond] do as you wish and as if it were for 
yourself, having always due regard to lending well and, again, not to get yourself 
too indebted with anyone, and especially with Diamante degli Alberti & co.”108 
 Within very explicitly stated constraints, partners in corrispondenti relationships 
both offered to do whatever each other requested and were authorized to take 
discretionary action on behalf of each other, taking advantage of local opportunities. The 
accounting methods for keeping tabs on these discretionary actions were the paired conti 
correnti and conti di esercizio discussed above. To spell out the mechanics of this: 
correspondent A would take discretionary action on behalf of correspondent B, charging 
B’s current account in A’s book, and recording therein A’s actions taken and B’s 
financial commitments.109 This was really A giving credit to B, since this was B’s 
account money but A’s disposable cash being used. Typically B would do likewise for A, 
thereby paying back the “loan” not with cash but with reciprocated discretionary actions. 
If all went well, which it did not always, each side actively made money for the other.  
 The word “to lend” in these and other Renaissance business letters is credere, 
which normally means “to believe” or “to believe in.”110 The language of medieval and 
Renaissance Italian expresses the idea that to offer someone credit typically meant having 
confidence in them, not only financially but also morally. “To give credit” and “to 
believe in someone” were essentially the same idea. Having credit was a sign that others 
trusted you to record your debts accurately, regard them seriously, and pay them 
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promptly. It was also a sign that you were a person of character and honor, in more 
domains than just the economic. 
Amicizia: 
While fifteenth-century Florentine business letters overwhelmingly focus on the 
day-to-day details of transactions, spelling them out monotonously and repetitiously, it is 
also true that they are inflected sufficiently often with the rhetorics of friendship and 
fictive kinship to see these framings as constitutive of commercial interaction. This is 
how Andrea Bardi could directly link the terms mercantivolemente (in a merchant-like 
way) and amichevolmente (in a friendly way) in a letter111 concerning the resolution of a 
differenza to the Orlandini company in Bruges on March 26, 1405. Consider the 
following additional examples: 
“Your offer we accept like dear friends (chari amici), and we see that by your 
Tommaso you have written concerning our condition and company: this he did as 
a worthy (valente) person and out of courtesy… And although you have many 
friends here who serve you, nonetheless we offer ourselves to all of your 
pleasures and, wanting advice concerning one thing or another, tell us and I will 
do it willingly (faròllo volentieri).”112  
 
“As much as you offer to do with love in this matter, all of it we have observed, 
and we thank you for it, and we are certain you would do even more; and if 
anything occurs in Avignon or here that needs to be done, we will commit 
ourselves to you loyally (con fidanza), advising you of it first… As for us, you 
may do with us as you would with your own, and we will do all we can. Thus we 
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have told your Tommaso and prayed him to have such confidence in us as one 
could with you.”113   
 
“I will take confidence with you as I believe I may, and I would like that this 
confidence remain between us.”114  
In part, the language in these passages may reflect important concerns of the 
theologians who elaborated the Church’s usury doctrine and whose ideas appeared in the 
confessional guidebooks consulted by the laity.115 Here we have in mind specifically the 
idea that the economy was constituted by a community of the faithful linked together in 
love, and the theologians’ emphasis on the importance of a completely, unconditionally 
free will for an economic transaction to be considered legitimate.116 But the language 
here also recalls the language of patronage letters – itself undoubtedly shaped by 
religious themes and imagery, but also existing as an autonomous mode of mutually 
supportive social interaction. The final sentence of the Borromei letter is a common 
concluding element of much correspondence, but appears with particular regularity in 
patronage-related letters where writers assure recipients of their loyalty to each other.117 
Amicizia was not a word that had a single, clear-cut meaning: it could be understood in 
religious, in political, in economic, or even in humanistic inflections,118 depending on the 
context or the multiple contexts. 
Florentines saw no contradiction between friendship and making money. Theirs 
was an instrumental conception of friendship.119 One purpose of helping each other was 
to make money, but also one purpose of making money was to make friends, through 
generosity or ‘liberality’ with gifts.120 Profit and friendship were paired concepts in the 
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Florentine understanding, both facets of the same social-exchange mentality of 
constructing each other through reciprocity. 
 Leon Battista Alberti put this idea this way, through the mouth of his businessman 
character Giannozzo:  
“I should be glad to remain here with you as long as you like, but I see my friend 
whom I must help at the Palace. We made an appointment early this morning, and 
it will soon be time to appear there. I do not wish to fail my friend, for I have 
always liked helping others rather than asking for help myself, and I have always 
preferred having others under obligation to me rather than the opposite. I like 
doing him a favor, helping him as much as possible with words and deeds, not so 
much because I know he loves me, but because I know he is a good and just man. 
You must always regard good people as friends and you must always love and 
help the just even though you may not know them.”121  
An actual businessman from a later period phrased the idea as follows: 
“With regard to Galilei and company, I see that there is no more need of 
blandishments for in truth they do things like gentlemen. The letter which I have 
from them now is so full, so much to the point, and so agreeable that I feel under a 
permanent bond of obligation to them… Maintain close relations with them and 
we over here will always perform our part duly as we do every day; of this you 
and they will be the judge.”122 
Out of context, one might not realize that these are businessmen talking. 
 Interpreting business relations as friends occurred not only when business was 
going well but also when business went bad, even very bad: 
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“We want only what is owed to us. May it please you also to want to do thus, and 
truly, for in good faith not a little have we discussed this dispute between us. May 
you or yours also wish to settle it as is done between friends. And so let it please 
you that not having sent these letters [i.e., business correspondence germane to 
the dispute] to [your office in] Florence, to send them without further delay.”123 
 
“I am advised by many letters that Basciano [da Pessina] is not there. You will 
have spoken with him about these blessed accounts that, by his shortcomings, are 
not settled, and truly it is a great wrong; this is not the friendship (amicizia) and 
brotherhood (fratelanza) that I had with him, and he has not done well in 
clamming up with me (pigliare gozzo), and I don’t know why… And I must 
observe that when he made accounts with me in Avignon, that amounted to 
40,000 pounds or so, there was not even a penny missing, we had such a great 
relationship, so that one could go so far as to say that if I owed him 1000 florins, I 
would approach him and say to him how I considered him more than a brother, 
and I still do. And despite what he has done to me, I will never forget the love and 
brotherhood that was between him and me.”124  
 The ambiguous meanings of amizicia, or even of amore, were in no way precise 
enough to imply what exactly to do in markets. The invocation of amicizia in business 
was instead an attempted negotiation in joint cognition of empathetic understanding of 
each others’ interests and an attempted negotiation in joint behavior of social-exchange 
reciprocity. Words by themselves could not enforce reliable economic behavior. For that, 
the social anchoring of language in actual families and in actual neighborhoods, with 
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third-party observers and enforcers, was helpful. But ambiguities in shared language were 
essential for the creative relational extension and groping of Renaissance businessmen 
beyond the limits of their social inheritance. The language of amicizia was an important 
first step in this Florentine relational extension from family and neighborhood into 
markets, but by itself that dyadic trope was not sufficient for scaling up into large, far-
reaching and highly connected credit networks. 
Onore: 
 Like amicizia, the word onore did not have a single unambiguous meaning in 
Renaissance Florence. As was evident in our statistics, the republican conception of 
onore as “public office” or “service to the state” was alive and well in the Florence of 
1427. But medieval conceptions of onore as ancient lineage or as martial glory had 
hardly vanished, especially among magnates. And sober guildsmen conceptions of onore 
as thrift, discipline and hard work maintained their appeal, especially among new men. 
Newer conceptions of onore as patronage, in the senses of liberality and magnificenza, so 
prominent in the Medici regime soon to come, were starting to gain traction. Many of 
these alternative meanings of onore and nobility were put into debate with each other in 
the humanist dialogues of the time.125 Such multiple meanings could co-exist, because all 
of them entailed the imperative of meeting all of one’s social obligations and 
expectations, in one’s own eyes (character) and also in the eyes of others (reputation). 
Disagreement existed, however, about the exact content of those obligations and 
expectations. To the extent that the inflection was on the republican conception of onore, 
service to the community was highlighted, with commercial credit flowing in recognition 
of that.  
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 Regardless of precise inflection, business-letter discussions of honor came up 
most often in times of economic trouble. Thus, for example, in a dispute concerning a 
thousand florins missing because of the actions of a certain Michele, Andrea de’ Bardi 
wrote to both Antonio di Sandro Cittadini and Domenico Pazzi in May of 1405 that they 
should take action “for the honor of said Michele.”126 And in a letter of March 31, 1404, 
Bardi wrote to Alberto Aldobrandini in Paris urging him to settle a particular deal 
because it redounded to both his honor (onore) and his advantage (utile).127 In the same 
letter quoted above about the Basciano deadbeat, Datini went on to assert that “I would 
come back a thousand miles to do my duty towards him and every other good affair; and 
it concerns his honor not to do likewise to me, even if I did not merit it.”128  
 In this context, complimenting someone about their honor might gain overtones of 
a veiled threat about loss of that honor: 
“Dearest friend, …When I was there I spoke to you many times about the money 
that you owe to the heirs of your partner Antonio di Tuccio Manetti. And now 
Andrea di Buonaventura has arrived there, who comes there for this reason and 
for other business of his, and he has begged me that I write to you concerning this 
matter, and that I pray of you that you should wish to act towards him as the 
worthy man that you are. And I am quite certain it need not be said to you, that 
you will pay your debt to him in this matter, both out of duty, and also to lighten 
the burden on your heart. And I pray of you that you should wish to do this for 
them like the worthy man that you are.”129  
Indeed the question of honor was always tied, overtly or covertly, to the issue of 
reputation (fama). Fama typically refers to other merchants’ collective evaluation of 
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one’s interior character or soul. Gossip – either orally or through letters – was the 
mechanism through which such collective evaluations were made. Such gossip could help 
you: 
“I, Andrea, have received letters from Ciandrello. I have told him so much about 
you, and that you have done him such honor, that if something pertained to you 
alone it would suffice [to obtain his help]. And if it were not already the case that 
I were obligated (obrighato) to you in every respect, now I am [obligated to you] 
that much more, and I thank you.”130 
Or such gossip could hurt you: 
“We have heard via letters from Montpelier that this Guglielmo Pigniolo has lost 
the confidence [of others: avea perduto la fede]. We do not know if this is true. 
These times are too dangerous. Tell us what you hear of it, and similarly how the 
affairs of the Bocci are proceeding, having seen these fail and how many evils 
have come this year to merchants.”131  
Tommaso Spinelli provides a clear example of the link between merchant gossip 
and personal anxiety about honor. In his letter to his friend Gherardo Maffei about the 
setbacks he received as a Papal banker,132 Spinelli referred to his honor – as Jacks and 
Caferro put it, the banker’s most precious commodity – fully six times in this letter, 
sometimes in salvific terms. He wrote that the Pope “has found out the truth and has 
recognized that I did my duty, and he has endorsed me as a faithful man and a good 
merchant, and it is clear that I have done the greatest service to the Church of God for a 
long time, and thus he absolves me and imposes silence on whosoever would speak to the 
contrary.” The last part of the absolution pleased him the most, as it would clear his name 
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“in the presence of merchants, and I greatly desire this strictly for honor’s sake… I will 
have lost my [goods], but I will at least have conserved my honor.” All of this was driven 
by Tommaso’s strong desire to leave the Pope’s employ with a good reputation for 
himself (ch’io lassi buona fama di me). 
The establishment and measurement of honor through gossip among businessmen 
was important to the discipline of Florentine markets. But in social exchange there is also 
the deeper idea of making each other through gifts. “For Paolo da Certaldo, ‘a man 
without a friend is like a body without a soul’ and ‘a man who loses his friends is worse 
than dead’.”133 This was no mere metaphor in Renaissance Florentine markets. Because 
credit was the lifeblood of Florentine business, fellow businessmen made you by 
extending credit and business to you, and they could destroy you by withdrawing that 
from you. Social exchange was not orthogonal to markets; it was the discipline that made 
personalistic markets work. 
Republican elections to Priorate did not substitute for this process of intense 
gossip among merchants about each other’s honor. Rather they built upon it by measuring 
and certifying gossip about character into a public status observable by all. Election to 
Priorate was not an automatic guarantee of one’s economic credit-worthiness. But it was 
an institutionalized signal, backed by dense third-party networks, that even someone not 
known directly by you might be worth taking a business chance on. Thereby cliquish 
personal networks based on private amicizia opened out into elitist personal networks 
based on public onore. 
Our emphasis on the blending of economic and political logics in interpersonal 
interaction in Renaissance Florence is reinforced by the widespread presence of the same 
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language of raccomandazione in both business and patronage letters.134 By 
raccomandazione, Florentines did not simply mean being recommended to others, and 
certainly not only being recommended to others for specific tasks or opportunities. 
Raccomandazione was equally, but more profoundly, a plea for recognition. To 
recommend oneself to another, as Florentines so formulaically did in the conclusions of 
their letters, was to ask to be remembered by another, to respect and be respected by 
another. To be in a circle of raccomandazione definitely yielded material benefits, but it 
also signified one’s membership in a community of people who promised to act 
responsibly and supportively towards each other, in a manner similar to explicit claims to 
honor. To deny the need for raccomandazione was not to deny its value, but to uphold the 
certainty of its being offered. This is the cultural meaning behind Bartolomeo Rustichi’s 
assertion to the Datini company in Genoa that 
“We do not recommend to you very much our own affairs: it does not seem to us 
necessary, but we consider you will undertake them employing such diligence as 
were they your own; and this we remind you, and pray of you and we will do the 
same for you.”135  
Florentine businessmen in markets and Florentine politicians in state offices did 
not do the same things, but they communicated in similar ways. This is perhaps not 
surprising since, during the Albizzi regime of 1382-1433 in particular, there was so much 
dual-role overlap between these two sets of actors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Neo-classical economic theory is constructed on the assumption of impersonal 
markets – choices are made on the basis of goods and their prices, not on the basis of the 
identities of the persons transacting. Renaissance Florentine markets did not operate like 
this, especially in the most technically advanced sectors of the Florentine economy. There 
is, therefore, historical need for the development of an economic theory of the operation 
and evolution of personalistic markets.136  
The case of Florence suggests the following elements for such a theory:  
(a) Social exchange and reciprocity are the micro-mechanisms of economic 
exchange, with credit being the currency. Capitalist inventions like double-entry 
accounting and partnership systems formalized and perfected personal exchange, 
not displaced it. 
(b) Gossip about reputation provides discipline to the market, as much as do prices. 
(c) The network structure of economic exchange in the market grows on the lattice of 
other social networks that provide its context. Economic networks can be cliquish 
and incestuous, or they can be open and expansive, depending upon how multiple-
network feedback is arranged. Porous political-cum-social elites are helpful for 
open and expansive economic markets. 
(d) Political institutions are important for the development of markets not only 
because of enforcement of rule of law. Depending upon details, republican 
political institutions may add public transparency and efficiency to the operation 
of private gossip; and they can induce the overlay of multiple social roles, such as 
merchant and politician. 
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(e) Linguistic and network ambiguity induces creative exploration and innovation in 
social relationships, even as it enables free riding and lies. Policing the latter 
should not be so strict as to squelch the former. 
How much these findings generalize to other historical and comparative settings 
remains to be explored in depth, but we suspect their widespread applicability.
 46
Endnotes: 
                                                 
1 We would like to acknowledge and to thank those who have directly contributed invaluable research labor 
to this project, over the years: Christopher Ansell, Nicoletta Baldini, Skye Bendor-deMoll, Nick Collier, 
Matteo Columbi, Sasha Goodman, Michael Heaney, Doowan Lee, Peter McMahan, Piera Morlacchi, Pip 
Pattison, Katalin Prajda, David Sallach, Ethel Santacroce, Douglas White, and Xing Zhong. McLean also 
appreciates the valuable comments of Chip Clarke, Frank Dobbin, Neha Gondal, Ann Mische and Tom 
Rudel.  Padgett acknowledges the generous financial support of this project from the Santa Fe Institute, the 
Hewlett foundation, and the National Science Foundation’s program on Human and Social Dynamics. 
2 Pp. 23-24 in Richard A. Goldthwaite, “The Medici Bank and the World of Florentine Capitalism,” Past 
and Present 114 (1987): 3-31. 
3 For an overview, see Raymond de Roover, “The Organization of Trade,” pp. 42-118 in The Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe. Vol. 3. Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages. (Cambridge, England, 
1963). See also Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore, Md.: 
forthcoming). 
4 See for example, Karl Polanyi, “The Economy as an Instituted Process,” pp.243-269 in Trade and 
Markets in the Early Empires, edited by Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson 
(Glencoe, Illinois, 1957). See also Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem 
of Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481-510. 
5 John F. Padgett, “Open Elite? Social Mobility, Marriage and Family in Renaissance Florence, 1282-
1494,” Renaissance Quarterly, forthcoming, and http://home.uchicago.edu/~jpadgett. 
6 David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Tuscans and their Families: A Study of the Florentine 
Catasto of 1427 (New Haven, Conn.: 1985). The Herlihy-Klapisch data set is publicly available on line at 
www.stg.brown.edu/projects/catasto. 
7 Archivio di Stato di Firenze [hereafter A.S.F.], Catasto 64-85 contain scribal summaries (campioni) of all 
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documents did not itemize the entire list of debtors and creditors for any given business. Very frequently 
these lists were so lengthy that governmental scribes took recording shortcuts in the campioni.  
8 Historians have often found examples of cheating on Renaissance Florentine tax returns, but mostly these 
refer to catasti after the original one in 1427. For example, Raymond de Roover, The Rise and Decline of 
the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 (New York: 1966), pp. 25, 30, 73-4, 99, 236, 312-3; William Caferro, “The 
silk business of Tommaso Spinelli, fifteenth-century Florentine merchant and papal banker,” Renaissance 
Studies 10 (1996), pp. 421-22.  In contrast to these undoubted cases of cheating, we find that accurate 
reporting in the 1427 catasto was the norm. In our commercial-credit data set, out of the debts where cross-
checking was possible due to both bilanci being coded, debtor and creditor reports matched xx% of the 
time. A study with similar findings is  Rebecca Emigh, “Loans and Livestock: Comparing Landlords’ and 
Tenants’ Declarations from the Catasto of 1427,” The Journal of European Economic History 25 (1996): 
705-23. Apparently, while Florentines eventually learned how to cheat on their taxes quite effectively, they 
did not do so immediately, perhaps because of the cross-checking design of the system. In any event, below 
we analyze existence versus nonexistence of a credit, not the reported value of the credit. 
9 Richard Goldthwaite has brought to our attention three surviving account books, which overlap with our 
catasto summaries of them: those of Andrea Banchi, silk manufacturer; Alamanno di Jacopo Salviati, wool 
manufacturer; and Lorenzo di Palla Strozzi, merchant-banker. 
10 The only other published study of pre-modern credit on this scale of which we are aware is Philip T. 
Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of 
Credit in Paris, 1660-1870  (Chicago: 2000). That excellent study of Parisian bankers covers a period two 
centuries after ours. Soon, however, there will appear a quantitative analysis of all of the outstanding notary 
contracts in medieval Genoa. Quentin Van Doosselaere, “From Feudal to Modern: Social Dynamics and 
Commercial Agreements in Medieval Genoa,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, Columbia 
University, 2007). While not as rich cross-sectionally as our data set, the Van Doosselaere data set has 
more temporal depth than does ours. His study and ours are compatible in many ways. 
11 Paul D. McLean and John F. Padgett, “Was Florence a perfectly competitive market? Transactional 
evidence from the Renaissance,” Theory and Society 26 (1997): 209-244. The full data set, including both 
personal and business debts, contains 15,317 debts; the company subset analyzed here contains 4,992 debts. 
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12 The export sector was comprised of  the following industries: (a) Florentine international merchant-banks 
resident in non-Tuscan locations; (b) Merchant trading companies in Pisa; (c) Domestic banks and 
merchant-banks in Florence; (d) Silk manufacturers; (e) Wool manufacturers in San Martino district (high 
quality cloth); (f) Wool manufacturers, other districts (lower quality cloth); (g) Cloth retailers (ritagliatori); 
and (h) Cloth dyers (tintori). Companies were coded into industries based on their location and their 
primary transactional content. As demonstrated in table 3, however, some companies participated in more 
than one industrial activity. 
13 The compliance of these firms with catasto requirements evidently was handled with some flexibility, 
perhaps due to the special difficulties they faced in preparing and submitting their books for examination in 
Florence. 
14 John F. Padgett and Paul D. McLean, “Economic and Social Exchange in Renaissance Florence,” Santa 
Fe Institute working paper 02-07-032 (http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/publications-working-
papers.php: 2002), pp. 45-46. 
15 These numbers may appear low for what purports to be a comprehensive picture of the Florentine 
economy, but these reported percentages are somewhat deceptive. Two types of transactions, present in our 
complete data set, are systematically excluded from analysis in this article: credits and debts with most 
firms and artisans working outside the export-oriented economy, and credits and debts with individuals 
rather than with companies. Had it been possible to calculate the more correct denominator of “all debts 
and credits among companies in export-oriented industries,” percent coverage would have been very much 
higher than the conservative numbers reported here. 
16 Fixed-cost assets in this setting were low. Cloth manufacturing occurred in the home through the putting-
out system, and hence required low assets. Warehouses or fondaci were more valuable assets, but even 
these were not so large as to require depreciation (cost-accounting being an invention of the future). 
17 Federigo Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medievale: Studi nell’Archivio Datini di Prato (Siena: 
1962), tavola LXIX. Raymond de Roover (1966), pp. 47, 55, 69. Richard A. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in 
Renaissance Florence (Princeton, N.J.: 1968), p. 48. Tommaso Spinelli in the second half of the fifteenth 
century earned profit rates in silk comparable to those among merchant bankers, but his profit rates were 
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very high. Philip Jacks and William Caferro, The Spinelli of Florence: Fortunes of a Renaissance Merchant 
Family (Univerity Park, Pa.: 2001), pp. 78-79.  
18 Of course they were larger and wealthier in the first place in part because of their success with credit. 
[Add a correlation here?] 
19 The rather astonishing total debt figure for this one branch was 158,238 florins. The corresponding total 
credit figure was 147,987 florins. Cosimo’s companies, like others but even more so, relied on massive 
volumes of two-way turnover and credit flow, organized through a partnership system. 
20 A dramatic example of this will be discussed in quotations below from the diary of Gregorio Dati, one of 
the successful silk manufacturers in our data set. 
21 Since figure 1 is based on number of debts, rather than value of debts, one could conceivably challenge 
this statement on the ground that the value of average woolen-cloth sales to merchant-bankers was much 
greater than value of such sales to ritagliatori (Goldthwaite, personal communication). Statement (b), 
however, remains true even when re-calculated on basis of total florin value. Namely, the total monetary 
value of Wool, San Martino credits to all merchant-banks combined (that is, international merchant-bank, 
plus Pisa merchant, plus domestic bank) was 40,592 florins, compared to credits of 58,392 florins to 
ritagliatori. And the total value of Wool, Other credits to all merchant-banks combined was 18,247 florins, 
compared to credits of 32,260 florins to ritagliatori. In fact, within our coding constraint of greater-than-or-
equal-to 10 florins, there was not much difference in average value of woolen-cloth sales to ritagliatori, as 
compared to those made to export-oriented merchants in Pisa and to domestic bankers. There was a 
substantial difference in the average value of wool credits offered to ritagliatori compared to international 
merchant-bankers, however.    
22 Merchant-bankers still received roughly twice as much in volume of their cloth input from wool 
manufacturers as from silk manufacturers. Even though wool was on the decline, and silk on the rise, the 
older wool industry was still much larger in 1427 than the newer silk industry. 
23 Again to measure this in terms of monetary value, rather than in terms of numbers of debts, domestic 
banks gave 33,662 florins of credits to setaiuoli in our data set; whereas they gave 27,080 florins to Wool, 
San Martino lanaiuoli and 15,682 florins to Wool, Other lanaiuoli. As baseline comparison, there were 
over two-and-a-half times more lanaiuoli companies than setaiuoli companies in 1427 (see table 1).  
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24 These data imply economically healthy banking and merchant-banking industries in 1427. This is not 
inconsistent, however, with a soon-to-come recession in 1430-33 induced by the fiscal crisis caused by war 
with Lucca. See De Roover (1966), p. 230;  Anthony Molho, Florentine Public Finances in the Early 
Renaissance, 1400-1433 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1971), pp. 153-63; Elio Conti, L’imposta diretta a Firenze nel 
Quattrocento, 1427-1494 (Roma: 1984), p. 34. The 1427 catasto indeed had to be redone in 1431 and 1433, 
because of economic stress. The high leverage rates documented in table 2 help to explain the vulnerability 
of an otherwise healthy economy in 1427 to recession in 1430-33, since exorbitant tax extractions needed 
to be paid in cash, not in credits. Any simultaneous calling in of massive numbers of credits induces a 
liquidity crisis. Ironically, the 1427 catasto, the source of these credit data, made all-too-efficient tax 
extraction possible, thereby inducing its own demise. In understandable reaction to fiscal expropriation, 
Florentine businessmen learned to lie in subsequent catasti. 
25 The Florentine wool industry suffered a 72% decline in production from 1373 to its nadir of 1437. See 
Franco Franceschi, Oltre il “Tumulto”: I lavoratori fiorentini dell’Arte della Lana fra Tre e Quattrocento 
(Firenze: 1993), p. 13; Hidetoshi Hoshino, L’Arte della Lana in Firenze nel basso medioevo (Florence: 
1980), pp. 227-31; Sergio Tognetti, Un’industria di lusso al servizio del grande commercio: il mercato dei 
drappi serici e della seta nella Firenze del Quattrocento (Florence: 2002), p. 16. Debates continue about the 
causes of this decline, but the argument in the literature that seems the most compelling to us is the rapid 
growth of English woolen-cloth production in this same period, which deprived Florence of much of its 
primary input – high-quality English raw wool. Hoshino (1980), p. 233; E.M. Carus-Wilson and Olive 
Coleman, England’s Export Trade, 1275-1547 (Oxford: 1963), pp. 122, 138. 
26 Eventually Florentine garbo woolen cloth found favor in international trade with the Levant, when the 
Ottomans conquered Byzantium. For this among other reasons the Florentine wool industry recovered in 
the second half of the fifteenth century. Hoshino (1980), pp. 239-44, 268-75. 
27 Bruno Dini, “L’industria serica in Italia. Secc. XIII-XV,” pp. 91-123 in La seta in Europa, Secc. XIII-
XX, edited by S. Cavaciocchi (Florence: 1993). Franco Franceschi, “Florence and Silk in the Fifteenth 
Century: the Origins of a Long and Felicitous Union,” Italian History and Culture 1 (1995): 3-22. Tognetti 
(2002), pp. 11-42. 
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28 The percentage in 1427 of merchant-bankers of all types (international, Pisa, and domestic) who were 
upper-class popolani or magnates was 66.4%. Padgett and McLean (2002), p. 48. Conversely the 
percentage of setaiuoli who were middle- and lower-class in social background (i.e., new men, new-new 
men, and never admitted to Priorate) was 64.6% Hence the economic sponsorship of silk-manufacturing by 
merchant-bankers through liberal credit had the social-class overtones of patron-client relations. [For 
comparison, the percentage of wool manufacturers in 1427 who were popolani or magnates was 48.8%; the 
percentage of ritalgliatori or cloth retail who were popolani or magnates was 39.7%; and the percentage of 
tintori or cloth dyers who were popolani or magnates was 14.8%.] See also Tognetti (2002). 
29 There is a long and contentious literature about whether or not there was a “depression in the 
Renaissance.” One end of the debate was anchored by Robert S. Lopez and H.A. Miskimin, “The 
Economic Depression of the Renaissance,” Economic History Review 14 (1962): 408-26. They pointed to 
the decline of the wool industry, among other things. The other end of the debate was anchored by Carlo 
M. Cipolla, “Economic Depression of the Renaissance,” Economic History Review 14 (1962): 519-524, 
and by Richard A. Goldthwaite, Wealth and the Demand for Art in Italy, 1300-1600 (Baltimore, Md.: 
1993), pp. 13-39. They pointed to the rise of the silk industry, among other things. Judicious overviews of 
this debate are provided by Judith C. Brown, “Prosperity or Hard Times in Renaissance Italy?” Renaissance 
Quarterly 42 (1989): 761-80, and by Franco Franceschi, “The economy: work and wealth,” pp. 124-144 in 
Italy in the Age of the Renaissance, edited by John M. Najemy (Oxford: 2004). No study based on a one-
year cross-section like this one can resolve a debate about economic trends. We do regard the fifteenth-
century adaptation of the Florentine economy as a success story, however, in the narrow sense that the silk 
industry was developed to offset decline in the wool industry. Whether the successful development of silk 
was quantitatively enough to offset the sharp contraction of wool is a topic we leave to others to decide.   
30 Because of this fact, our statistical summary actually under-represents the significance of recurrent 
transactions funded through credit. When single unreciprocated credits (coded here as “transactional”) 
actually were current accounts, then “relational” would have been a better linguistic description of that. We 
could have cleaned up this source of measurement error in our data if content information had been 
recorded for more than 11% of the credits.  
31 De Roover (1966), pp. 108-141. 
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32 Federigo Melis, “La grande conquista trecentesca del ‘credito di esercizio’ e la tipologia dei suoi 
strumenti sino al XVI secolo,” pp. 307-24 in his La Banca pisana e le origini della banca moderna, edited 
by M. Spallanzi (Firenze: [1972] 1987). 
33 Raymond de Roover, “The Development of Accounting prior to Luca Pacioli according to the Account 
Books of Medieval Merchants,” pp. 143-46 in his Business, Banking, and Economic Thought in Late 
Medieval and Early Modern Europe, edited by Julius Kirshner (Chicago: [1956] 1974). 
34 Double-entry bookkeeping could be done without bilateral format, through an elaborate system of cross-
references, but it was more cumbersome to do it that way. De Roover (1974), p. 132n2. 
35 For documentation of the timing and rate of bilateral-format-accounting diffusion, see pp. 1539-42 in 
John F. Padgett and Paul D. McLean, “Organizational Invention and Elite Transformation: The Birth of 
Partnership Systems in Renaissance Florence,” American Journal of Sociology 111 (2006): 1463-1568. For 
example, a fragment of Averardo de’ Medici’s 1395 account books explicitly states they were being kept “a 
partita doppia” (A.S.F., Mediceo avanti il Principato [hereafter M.A.P.] 133, p. _).  And a fragment of the 
main ledger of the partnership of Francesco and Niccolò di Simone Tornabuoni from 1425 (A.S.F., M.A.P. 
84, p. 9) clearly indicates that company’s adoption of an accounts-centered organization of their books.  
36 In today’s Italian Civil Code (chapter 26, articles 1823-24) il conto corrente refers to a contract between 
two private parties in which no money is exchanged but rather in which reciprocal credits are recorded. We 
thank Alessandro Lomi for bringing this modern descendent to our attention. 
37 The complication is that there could be more than one account linking the same pair of persons, if 
multiple startup deposits or credits were made for whatever reasons. We use this fact statistically below. 
38 In the 1416 founding contract of a company with partners Giovanni de’ Medici, Benedetto and Larione 
de’ Bardi, and Matteo di Andrea Barucci (A.S.F., M.A.P. 94, p. 116), Matteo promised “to keep good 
accounts, as if they were money in cash.” 
39 De Roover (1974), pp. 121-125.  
 
40 There was a third transitional form of accounting in which credits were collected in the first half of the 
account book and debts in the second half, with elaborate cross-referencing between the two halves. De 
Roover (1974), pp. 132-34. This form permitted double-entry profit calculations without making current 
accounts the fundamental unit of the system. A good example of this intermediate form is found in the 
 53
                                                                                                                                                 
Alberti libri mastri of 1348-59, published and analyzed by Richard A. Goldthwaite, Enzo Settesoldi, and 
Marco Spallanzani (eds.), Due libri mastri degli Alberti: una grande compagnia di Calimala, 1348-1358 
(Firenze: 1995). In particular, “Accounts with other firms or outside persons were opened, for the most 
part, for single transactions. If later a client presented himself another time, the accountant of the Alberti 
preferred to open new accounts.” (p. 113) Truly on-going current accounts did exist in the 1348-59 Alberti 
libri mastri, but only for Alberti family members and for company employees (so-called conti interni). 
41 Raymond de Roover, “Early Accounting Problems of Foreign Exchange,” The Accounting Review 19 
(1944): 381-407. The Bardi correspondence of 1404-05 and the bilanci in the 1427 catasto, discussed 
below, more commonly used the expressions per noi (for us, on our account) and per voi (for you, on your 
account). 
42 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (New York: [1925] 
1967). Alvin Gouldner, “The Norm of Reciprocity,” American Sociological Review 25 (1960): 161-78. 
Andrew Strathern, The Rope of Moka: Big-men and Ceremonial Exchange in Mount Hagen, New Guinea 
(Cambridge, England: 1971). 
43 Hence “A French satirist, in the fifteenth century, marveled at the ability of the Italians to do business 
without money. In dealing with them, he said, one never sees or touches any money; all they need to do 
business is paper, pen, and ink.” De Roover (1944), p. 381. Goldthwaite in his forthcoming book, The 
Economy of Renaissance Florence, chapter 6, discusses the use of “offset” among private Florentine 
individuals, as a form of “banking” outside of banks, without making any reference to anthropological 
social exchange. We thank Richard Goldthwaite for pre-publication access to this impressively broad and 
deeply researched work, the capstone of a brilliant career. We would add that “offset” (or as we would say 
“relational credit”) behavior was characteristic of the core of Florentine merchant banking, as well as of 
Florentines as private citizens. The fact that the same lending behavior was characteristic both of 
businesses in markets and of private people in their friendships reinforces our point about the homology 
between capitalist business corrispondenti and social-exchange. 
44 The converse of economic logic bleeding into the social domain is evident in the famous Florentine 
family diaries or ricordanze, which rhetorically mix family narrative histories and family account books. 
45 Three well documented examples of this company plasticity are these:  
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(a) On the subject of domestic banks, Sergio Tognetti usefully has corrected one of Raymond de 
Roover’s few mistakes. Sergio Tognetti, “L’attività di banca locale di una grande compagnia 
fiorentina del XV secolo,” Archivio Storico Italiano 155 (1997): 595-648. De Roover (1966), p. 
14-15, had argued, very influentially, that Florentine banks were sharply divided into three distinct 
and unrelated types: banchi di pegno (pawnshops), banchi a minuto (small domestic banks), and 
banchi grossi (large international banks). De Roover himself studied only the latter. Based on a 
careful study of the extensive account books of the Cambini bank, Tognetti instead argued that 
overlap of the latter two types was substantial: international banks frequently had domestic bank 
branches, and domestic banks frequently were involved in lucrative international business. Our 
catasto data, based on 100% of the banks extant in 1427, strongly supports the position of 
Tognetti.  On the other hand, Goldthwaite’s study of the small Cerchi banco a minuto in the 1450s 
reinforces de Roover’s original description. Richard A. Goldthwaite, “Local Banking in 
Renaissance Florence,” The Journal of European Economic History 14 (1985): 5-55. The 
resolution of this confusion is simple: there were two types of ‘domestic banks’, one of which was 
involved intimately in international business, and one of which was not. Our data on credits to and 
from the Domestic Bank industry are dominated by the former type of bank, because those banks 
were much bigger and more central in the Florentine economy than were the banchi a minuto, in 
1427 at least.  
(b) The fifteenth-century business and career of Andrea Banchi, thoroughly studied by Florence Edler 
de Roover, is a clear example of this industrial fluidity of Florentine firms: Florence Edler de 
Roover, “Andrea Banchi, Florentine Silk Manufacturer and Merchant in the Fifteenth Century,” 
Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 3 (1966): 223-85. Banchi without any doubt was a 
silk manufacturer (setaiuolo). Nonethless, as Banchi went around all over Europe searching for 
silk-cocoon raw materials to buy and silk cloth to sell, he sometimes was paid in wool or other 
commodities, of which then he had to dispose (p. 271). Banchi also acted like a banker, giving 
loans at interest to other setaiuoli “competitors” and to merchant-bankers (p. 227).  
(c)  The Maringhi correspondence (Richards, Gertrude (ed.), Florentine Merchants in the Age of the 
Medici: Letters and Documents from the Selfridge Collection of Medici Manuscripts. Cambridge, 
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exchange was augmented with all sorts of other goods flowing between the parties: various types 
of cloth, ribbons, cotton, rugs, pepper, rhubarb, drugs, fox pelts, horses, cheese, sausage, even 
caviar (the latter four items seeming very close to personal gifts). Indeed in the Maringhi 
correspondence it seems clear that the stronger the personal relationship between the traders, the 
wider the range of commodities exchanged.  
46 Having only one outstanding debt at a time, of course, does not preclude that debt being part of an 
iterated sequence of debts, which we cannot measure with cross-sectional data. We can offer one piece of 
anecdotal evidence from the catasto records to support our strong sense that many of our so-called 
“transactional” credits were iterated. Parigi di Tommaso Corbinelli’s bilanci stand out for reporting the 
dates on which credits were initiated. One entry, a credit he had with the firm of Zanobi di Gherardo 
Corigiani & Co. for fifty-three florins, is crossed out and marked pagato on May 20. Subsequently, he 
records a credit with the same firm dated November 14. It is certain, therefore, that these reported 
relational-credit figures underestimate the ‘true’ rate, were it possible to include ‘repeat business’ in our 
operational definition of relational exchange. 
47 This is a conservative indicator in the sense that stochastically it could happen that corrispondenti had 
only one conto corrente outstanding between them at a given moment in time. Reciprocity would have 
been observed had the observation time been longer. 
48 Vespasiano da Bisticci, Renaissance Princes, Popes and Prelates. The Vespasiano memoirs: Lives of 
illustrious men of the XVth century (New York: [~1480] 1963). Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy (New York: [1860] 1990). 
49 Data compiled from the annual guild censuses of banks from 1340 to 1399 contained in Archivio di Stato 
di Firenze [hereafter A.S.F.], Arte del Cambio 11, 14. 
50 Vespasiano da Bisticci ([~1480] 1963). Lauro Martines, The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 
1390-1460 (Princeton, N.J.: 1963). Richard A. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence 
(Princeton, N.J.: 1968). Francis William Kent, Household and Lineage in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 
N.J.: 1977). Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence (Princeton, N.J.: 1977). John F. 
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Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434,” American 
Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1259-1319. Jacks and Caferro (2001). 
51 Ronald E. Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood in Renaissance Florence (New York: 1982), p. 35. 
52 Padgett and Ansell (1993), p. 1263 [parenthesis added]. 
 
53 Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1985), p. 56. 
 
54 As arguably Francesco Datini, the “merchant of Prato”, would have liked to have done. Iris Origo, The 
Merchant of Prato: Daily Life in a Medieval Italian City (New York: 1957), pp. 82-83. Richard C. Trexler, 
Public Life in Renaissance Florence (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1980), p. 134. 
55 These data, collected over twenty years, were coded for purposes of Padgett’s larger research project, 
which is documenting and studying the co-evolution of political, economic, and kinship networks in 
Florence over two centuries, from 1300 to 1500. Currently there are 53,152 Florentines in Padgett’s 
ACCESS social-network database: 40,381 males and 12,771 females. Padgett gives special thanks to the 
people cited in acknowledgements for helping him with this very large task. 
56 Parent-child relations were inferred (a) from last and middle names, since Florentine males took the 
name of their father as their own middle name: as in Giovanni di Francesco, and (b) from numerous 
collateral sources of dating information. Douglas White kindly wrote a computer matching algorithm that 
assisted in this linkage task, during our collaboration at the Santa Fe Institute, for which we thank him. This 
task was complicated by the fact that names are often not consistent across archival sources. Currently there 
are 1,732 genealogically linked families in the dataset, each visually displayable into computerized family 
trees by the network-drawing program Pajek. 
57 Dated marriages were coded from numerous sources, the most important being the fourteen volumes of 
the Carta dell’Ancisa, located in the Archivio di Stato in Florence. Pierantonio dell’Ancisa was a 
seventeenth-century antiquarian who devoted his life to extracting and recording Florentine marriages out 
of extant dowry contracts. Most of the original dowry contracts, from which dell’Ancisa worked, have now 
been lost. There are 11,039 marriages in the current Padgett data set, estimated to comprise about 40-50% 
of all marriages between 1350 and 1500 of Florentines with last names.  See Padgett, “Open Elite? Social 
Mobility, Marriage and Family, 1282-1494,” Renaissance Quarterly (forthcoming) for data details and 
statistical analysis of these marriages, over time.  
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58 Florence was divided administratively into four quarters – Santo Spirito, Santa Croce, Santa Maria 
Novella, and San Giovanni. Each quarter in turn was subdivided into four gonfaloni or wards, making 
sixteen gonfaloni in all. Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1985) also coded residence in parish, when that 
information was registered in the castasto. Unfortunately parish information was registered too sporatically 
in the catasto to be useful, there being no official tax reason to do so.  
59 Information on both neighborhood and taxable personal wealth is contained in the 1427 catasto itself and 
is publicly available online at www.stg.brown.edu/projects/catasto. In addition to integrating this online 
dataset into his relational dataset, Padgett has coded and computerized other Florentine tax censuses as 
well: namely, the 1351 estimo, the 1378 prestanza, the 1403 prestanza, and the 1458 catasto. Padgett 
thanks Sam Cohn for providing him microfilm copies of the 1351 estimo and the 1378 prestanza. Padgett 
also has integrated the 1480 catasto dataset of Molho and Kirshner, generously provided by Molho. 
60 All members of the Priorate or city council from 1282 to 1500 (11,312 members in all) were coded by Padgett 
from an early eighteenth-century copy of the Priorista Mariani (A.S.F., Manoscritti 248-252) located at the 
Newberry Library in Chicago – namely, Priorista descritto a Tratte riscontro con quello delle riformagioni e con 
alter scritture publiche. All members of the Mercanzia or commercial court from 1310 to 1500 (3,316 member in all) 
were coded by Astorri, McLean, Padgett, and Prajda from the Fondo della Mercanzia located in the Archivio di 
Stato in Florence. Subsequent to our independent coding efforts, the Tratte office-holding data coded by David 
Herlihy before he died became available on the web, thanks to the labors of R. Burr Litchfield and his assistants: 
www.stg.brown.edu/projects/tratte. From these online resources, the political offices of Buonuomini, Gonfalonieri, 
and various guild consuls have been integrated into the relational dataset, with the valuable assistance of Xing 
Zhong. With coding help from Ethel Santacroce and Michael Heaney, and with computer assistance from Xing 
Zhong, the scrutiny votes in the elections of 1382, 1393, and 1411 also have been coded, computerized and 
integrated, although these data were not used in this article. All speakers in the Consulte e Pratiche from 1349 to 
1500 are currently in the process of being coded and computerized by Katalin Prajda. 
61 Scrutiny votes in 1433, secret to citizens at the time, were recorded in A.S.F., Tratte 359 for Tre 
Maggiore public offices. 
62 Social class background, in the Florentine context, refers to the date of first entry of a patrilineal ancestor 
to the Priorate, and hence can be reconstructed from Priorate office-holding data, together with family 
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genealogies. Popolani were Florentine patrilineages who first were elected to the Priorate from 1282 to 
1342; new men were Florentine patrilineages who first entered the Priorate from 1343 to 1377; ‘new-new 
men’ (our label, not theirs) were Florentine patrilineages who first entered the Priorate from 1378 to 1433.  
Magnates were old ‘feudal’ families specifically prohibited from holding Priorate office in 1292. Carol 
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates : Lineage and Faction in a Medieval Commune (Princeton, N.J.: 1991), 
pp. 239-240. Subsequently some of the branches of these families were rehabilitated through specific 
legislation. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Retour à la cité: Les magnats de Florence, 1340-1400 (Paris: 2006), 
pp. 453-457. The subcategory of “ex-magnates” was created to cope with such rehabilitations. Any 
Florentine patrilineage not included in the above categories is here labeled “families never admitted to 
Priorate” (by 1433). 
63 Membership in the 1433-4 Medici and Albizzi political factions, previously analyzed in Padgett and 
Ansell (1993), were originally reconstructed and reported in Dale Kent, The Rise of the Medici: Faction in 
Florence, 1426-1434 (Oxford: 1978), pp. 352-357. 
64 “Dichotomized credits” simply means collapsing the number of observed credits between companies into 
the binary “gives credit or not.” Zero-inflated Poisson regression would have been the statistical procedure 
had dichotomization not been employed, but unfortunately that approach suffered from erratic convergence 
problems, at least within the STATA computational package we used, probably because multiple credits 
often were too truncated to be distributed as Poisson. 
65 In a previous version of this paper, we further subdivided “asymmetric credits” into “single asymmetric” 
(or transactional) and “multiple asymmetric” (or multiple), but unfortunately the latter subtype in many 
markets had too few cases to sustain reliable statistical inquiry. 
66 In particular, * = (p ≤ .05); ** = (p ≤ .01); *** = (p ≤ .001). The more the asterisks, the greater the 
statistical certainty. 
67 This computed like an expected count in a contingency table – namely, (total number of dichotomized 
credits of giving company) * (total number of dichotomized debits of receiving company) / (total number 
of dichotomized credits in the entire market interface that the giver and receiver are operating within). 
“Market interface” is the intersection of the set of companies in the industry of the giver and set of 
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companies in the industry of the receiver. Given the eight industries analyzed here, there are 64 market 
interfaces, or more simply “markets”, within the Florentine export-oriented economy. 
68 “More than random” refers to fact that randomly one will find one out of twenty variables statistically 
significant at p < .05, even if nothing is going on. An argument can be made that we should also have 
rejected the “Between partnership system” variable on this ground, but here the one significant coefficient 
we found seems very substantively meaningful. Plus that was significant at the very strong p < .001 level. 
69 In an earlier version of this paper and in Padgett and McLean (2006), p. 1513, we reported that social-
class endogamy was statistically significant for domestic-banking partnerships, for all three social classes. 
This social-class-endogamy effect remains true for partnership (namely for how banks were formed), even 
though it is not true for commercial credit (namely for what those banks subsequently did). 
70 Again to compare with the findings in Padgett and McLean (2006), p. 1513, in-law effects on partnership 
within (not across) domestic-banking companies was both statistically significant and common. 
71 This conservative technique makes it more difficult to detect statistical significance by 
correcting/increasing observed coefficients’ estimated standard errors. 
72 In particular on the debate between Goldthwaite (1968) and F.W. Kent (1977). 
 
73 For what it’s worth, the coefficients for nuclear in-law relations were statistically significant six times. 
Even though not common, marrying the sister of another company’s partner definitely affected the two 
companies’ lending behavior toward each other when that occurred.   
74 “Almost” refers to the relative paucity of significant family coefficients in the markets involving 
ritagliatori – namely, between ritagliatori and wool, between ritagliatori and silk, and among ritagliatori. 
Indeed almost none of our social-context variables are significant in these relatively “impersonal” markets. 
75 See social-class data in footnote 28. 
 
76 Lorenz-curve analyses of income inequality among Florentine merchant-bankers, relative to the rest of 
the population are presented in Padgett and McLean (2006), p. 1536. These analyses show that Florentine 
merchant-bankers reached their peak of relative wealth in 1427, compared to 1351, 1378, 1403, 1458, and 
1480. 
77 Samuel K. Cohn, The Laboring Classes in Renaissance Florence (New York: 1980). D.V. Kent and F.W. 
Kent. Neighbours and Neighbourhood in Renaissance Florence: The District of the Red Lion in the 
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Fifteenth Century (Locust Valley, N.Y.: 1981). Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, “Kin, Friends and Neighbors: 
The Urban Territory of a Merchant Family in 1400,” pp. 68-93 in her Women, Family, and Ritual in 
Renaissance Italy (Chicago: 1985). Francis William Kent, “Ties of Neighborhood and Patronage in 
Quattrocento Florence,” pp. 79-98 in Patronage, Art, and Society in Renaissance Italy, edited by F.W. Kent 
and Patricia Simons (Oxford: 1987). Francis William Kent, Bartolomeo Cederni and his friends: Letters to 
an Obscure Florentine (Firenze: 1991). Nicholas A. Eckstein, The District of the Green Dragon: 
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78 Gene A. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 1343-1378 (Princeton, N.J.: 1962), pp. 126, 131. Dale 
Kent (1978), pp. 68, 178. 
79 Cf. Klapisch-Zuber (1985), p. 89. 
 
80 Padgett (2008), pp. 18-19. 
 
81 For the nine-person Priorate or city council, elected tours of duty were for two months, during which 
time councilors physically moved into the Palazzo Vecchio or city hall, leaving their business to be run by 
trusted others. After electing a large number of eligibles through an oligarchic voting procedure called the 
scrutiny, successful name-tags were placed into a monastically controlled bag, from which actual office-
holders were selected randomly every two months. Candidates did not know that they had been selected for 
city council until their name was drawn. The random component of this two-staged voting procedure was 
self-consciously designed to minimize self-reproducing control of the state by small factions. For the 
evolution of this republican voting procedure, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in 
Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 1982), and Nicolai Rubinstein, The 
Government of Florence under the Medici, 1434 to 1494  (Oxford : 1966). 
82 Gene Brucker (ed.), Two Memoirs of Renaissance Florence: The Diaries of Buonaccorso Pitti and 
Gregorio Dati (New York: 1967), pp. 125-6. Najemy (1982), pp. 299-300, 302. 
83 In his ricordanze or diary, Gregorio Dati noted: “I was in debt for over 3,000 florins. That same year 
1412, my name was drawn to be Standard-bearer of Justice [i.e., chairman of city council], and I served in 
that office. This was the beginning of my recovery.” Brucker (1967), pp. 139-140. 
84 L. F. Marks, “The Financial Oligarchy in Florence under Lorenzo,” pp. 123-147 in Italian Renaissance 
Studies, edited by E.F. Jacob (London: 1960). Also Molho (1971), pp. 166-182. 
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126 A.S.F., M.A.P. 87, pp. 343r and 343v. Honor, he noted elsewhere, required that corrispondenti look out 
for each other’s salvation (salvezza) as well as their own. (A.S.F., M.A.P. 87, p. 345v). 
127 [need citation here] 
128 Frangioni (1994), appendix, letter #8: Francesco Datini to Tieri di Benci in Avignon, August 4, 1392. 
129 Frangioni (1994), appendix, #18: Tommaso di ser Giovanni to Lorenzo di Tingo, May 28, 1400. 
130 A.S.F., M.A.P. 87, p. 337r: letter of October 1, 1404 from Andrea de’ Bardi to Orlandini company in 
Bruges. Honor typically communicated both an obligatory, internalized commitment and an expectation of 
assistance by others - a duality succinctly expressed by Bardi in a letter to Simone and Iacopo Covoni in the 
fall of 1404 (A.S.F., M.A.P. 87, p. 337v).  Here he both expressed his obligation to them (in su quello vi si 
scrisse esserne voi obrighato), and urged them to honor their obligation to him: “as long as we both shall 
live I am certain you will do your duty” (che quando viveremo sono certo farete il dovere). 
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131 A.S.F., M.A.P. 87, p. 340r: Andrea de’ Bardi to Lorenzo di Dinozzo & co in Avignon, April 4, 1405. 
132 See Jacks and Caferro (2001), pp. 75-6 and 303-4. On the notion of fama in general, see Thelma Fenster 
and Daniel Lord Smail (eds.), Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe (Ithaca, N.Y., 
2003). 
133 Weissman (1982), p. 28. 
134 See McLean (2007), chapter 6. 
135 Federigo Melis (ed.), Documenti per la storia economia dei secoli XII-XVI (Firenze: 1972), document 
#10: October 1395. 
136 For useful but incomplete steps in this direction, see Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds.), The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology (New York: 1994, 2005), James E. Rauch and Alessandra Casella (eds.), 
Networks and Markets (New York: 2001), and the many works cited in both of these surveys. 
 67
Table 1. CENSUS OF 1427 COMPANIES/PARTNERSHIPS IN MAJOR INDUSTRIES 
 
         High Certainty Companies        Low Certainty Companies 
 
        Florence       Overseas  Old        Florence       Overseas         Old  
 
International    0  45    7    0  10  2  
Merchant-Banks 
  
Pisa Merchant    0  20    1    0    1  0 
trading companies 
 
Domestic banks & 53    0  10  12    0  4 
Merchant-Banks 
 
Cloth Retail  32    3    5    4    1  2 
 
Silk Production 38    8    4  11    1  1 
 
Wool Production 
San Martino  36    5  10    2    0  0 
Via Maggio  27    0    2    1    0  0 
San Pancrazio    8    0    0    0    0  0 
San Pier Scheraggio   9    0    1    0    0  0 
Unclear Location 34    4    9  21    4  4 
All Wool Firms         114     9  22  24    4  4 
 
Cloth Dyers  18    0    3    7    0  2 
 
Other Industries (partial) 
  Fur     6    0    0    4    0  0 
  Gold     3    0    0    5    0  0 
  Linaioli    6    0    0  10    1  0 
  Merciai    6    1    0    5    1  1 
  Rigattieri    7    1    0    4    0  1 
  Speziali  11    0    2    1    0  0 
  Miscellaneous   6    1    5    6    0  1 
 
Unknown    9    9  10           110  20           15 
Industry 
 
Totals            312  94  69           203  39           33 
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Table 2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF 1427 CATASTO COMPANIES 
 
A. Average Capital/Corpo Size of Companies, in florins: 
 
          corpo1= corpo2= corpo3= 
        n     corpo    corpo1    corpo2   
         only  + profit + inventory 
        + sopraccorpo 
 
Merchant Banks    23   5080   5751    6973  
 (Int’l. + Pisa) 
Domestic Merchant Banks   24   6375   9941  10119  
 
Cloth Retail     21   4305   5348    7102  
 
Silk Manufacturing      25   3568   3928    4851  
  
Wool Manufacturing    30   3239   3654    4373  
 (San Martino) 
Wool Manufacturing    24   2030   2233    2517  
 (other) 
Cloth Dyeing       8   1095   1195    1595  
 
 
B. Average Leverage = Σi (total debt) / Σi (capital): 
 
           corpo1= corpo2= corpo3= 
        n     corpo    corpo1    corpo2   
         only  + profit + inventory 
        + sopraccorpo   
 
Merchant Banks    12     5.42     4.98    3.62  
 (Int’l. + Pisa) 
Domestic Merchant Banks   14     4.93     3.29     3.20 
 
Cloth Retail     14     2.20     1.66     1.15  
 
Silk Manufacturing    19     0.94     0.86     0.66  
 
Wool Manufacturing    23     1.17     1.04     0.84  
 (San Martino) 
Wool Manufacturing    16     0.54     0.48     0.41  
 (other) 
Cloth Dyeing       7     2.27     2.03     1.44  
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Table 3. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF CREDITS (when known) 
 
A. Among Merchant-Banks and Banks: 
 
 Relational    Transactional    Specialization of Credits: 
 Credits:   Credits:   (when two contents known) 
 
 70 Accounts   17 Accounts   51 Different categories 
 17 Banking activities  16 Banking activities  21 Similar: Accounts 
 19 Merchandise    6 Merchandise  45 Similar: Other categories 
 19 Cloth     6 Cloth 
 16 Raw materials    3 Raw materials 
   5 Other     4 Other 
 
B. Between Merchant-Banks and Others: 
 
 Relational    Transactional    Specialization of Credits: 
 Credits:   Credits:   (when two contents known) 
 
 17 Accounts   10 Accounts     5 Different categories 
   8 Banking activities  27 Banking activities    7 Similar: Accounts 
   3 Merchandise    4 Merchandise  19 Similar: Other categories 
 45 Cloth   38 Cloth 
 28 Raw materials  52 Raw materials 
   0 Other     3 Other 
 
C. Among Others: 
 
 Relational    Transactional    Specialization of Credits: 
 Credits:   Credits:   (when two contents known) 
 
   0 Accounts     2 Accounts     0 Different categories 
   3 Banking activities    4 Banking activities    0 Similar: Accounts 
   0 Merchandise    1 Merchandise    2 Similar: Other categories 
 15 Cloth   34 Cloth 
   1 Raw materials  14 Raw materials 
   0 Other     4 Other 
 
 
N.B.:  “Merchant-Banks” = Florentine merchant-banks resident abroad, Florentine 
merchant trading companies resident in Pisa, Florentine merchant-banks 
resident in Florence, and domestic cambio banks resident in Florence. 
 “Others” = Cloth Retailers, Silk Producers, Wool Producers: San Martino,  
Wool Producers: Other conventi, and Cloth Dyers  
 “Specialization” = contents in similar or different categories, when two contents known. 
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Table 4. VOLUME OF CREDITS: RELATIONS VS. TRANSACTIONS 
 
A. Reciprocal Credits: 
  debtor companies: 
creditor Banks    All Other    Total 
companies:     Companies 
 
Banks  427/953  =   .448  117/749  =   .156  544/1702  =  .320 
 
All Other 115/662  =   .174  232/1959 =  .118  347/2621  =  .132 
Companies 
 
Total  542/1615 =  .336  349/2708 =  .129  891/4323 =   .206 
   
 
B. Multiple Credits: 
  debtor companies: 
creditor Banks    All Other    Total 
companies:     Companies 
 
Banks  474/953  =   .497  169/749  =   .226  643/1702  =  .378  
 
All Other 160/662  =   .242  400/1959 =  .204  560/2621  =  .214 
Companies 
 
Total  634/1615 =  .393  569/2708 =  .210  1203/4323 =  .278 
 
 
 C. Relational Credits: 
  debtor companies: 
creditor Banks    All Other    Total 
companies:     Companies 
 
Banks  601/953  =   .631  234/749  =   .312  835/1702  =  .491 
 
All Other 230/662  =   .347  562/1959 =  .287  792/2621  =  .302 
Companies 
 
Total  831/1615 =  .514  796/2708 =  .294  1627/4323 =  .376 
 
 
N.B.: C is the union of A and B. 
  “Banks” equals {Int’l. m-banks, Pisa merchants, and Domestic m-b and banks}. 
“All Other Companies” equals {Cloth Retail, Silk Producers, Wool producers: 
both San Martino and other conventi, and Dyers}. 
Table 5. Extract/summary of significant coefficients from logit regressions on company credit in on-line Appendix 
 
A. All credits (dichotomous) 
   Between Partnership Nuclear Patrilineage Parentado Gonfalone Priorate Scrutiny Political 
Market:  part. systems Systems Family    Family    Family                                    (1433)     factions   
 
Int’l. M-B / Silk       3.128**        .00225** M: 5.943*** 
Int’l. M-B / Wool     5.534***           A: 2.905*** 
Int’l. Merch.-bank   6.496*** 3.662**  2.721*** 
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B  6.945**      1.822*  1.374*** 2.118***   M: 2.305*** 
Dom. Merch.-bank    5.291*  4.268*  1.974**    1.486*** 1.471***  
Dom. M-B / Wool             .635*    .00165** 
Dom. M-B / Silk           1.071*** 
Silk       5.571**            
Wool     13.726*** 3.288* 
Ritagliatori / Wool 
Ritagliatori    15.455** 
Ritagliatori / Silk  
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B. Reciprocal credits 
   Between Partnership Nuclear Patrilineage Parentado Gonfalone Priorate Scrutiny Political 
Market:  part. systems Systems Family    Family     Family                                   (1433)     factions 
Int’l. M-B / Silk       8.064**  2.559**        M: 6.380* 
Int’l. M-B / Wool     22.105*** 14.774*** 5.633**      .00817*** 
Int’l. Merch.-bank   7.322*** 5.937*** 3.526**        .00494** A: 2.276* 
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B  6.881*** 3.202**    2.542*  1.426**  2.547*    M: 3.793*** 
Dom. Merch-bank 1.110*** 10.831**       1.801**  
Dom. M-B / Wool   12.763**     3.739*  2.266*** 2.684**    M: 4.351*** 
Dom. M-B / Silk     13.902**     2.303*** 2.969*** 
Silk 
Wool 
Ritagliatori / Wool     8.542**          .00357* 
Ritagliatori 
Ritagliatori / Silk 
 
C. Non-reciprocal credits 
   Between Partnership Nuclear Patrilineage Parentado Gonfalone Priorate Scrutiny Political 
Market:  part. systems Systems Family     Family     Family                                    (1433)     factions 
Int’l. M-B / Silk   9.182*  18.013*         .00213* M: 6.084*** 
Int’l. M-B / Wool           1.080**      A: 3.169*** 
Int’l. Merch.-bank 
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B          1.232**  1.796**     
Dom. Merch.-bank     5.182**  2.148**    1.075**  1.861*** 
Dom. M-B / Wool               .00166** 
Dom. M-B / Silk                 A: 4.010* 
Silk       5.942** 
Wool     14.484*** 3.707* 
Ritagliatori / Wool 
Ritagliatori 
Ritagliatori / Silk 
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Table 6. Volume of “Personal” credits for all merchant-banking markets, by clusters of significant coefficients 
 
Percentage merchant-banking credits with independent variables not equal to zero in significant coefficients listed in table 5: 
 
    Partnership-  Family   Neighborhood  Political  All 
    system transfers: embedding:  embedding:  embedding:  together: 
A. All credits 
 
Domestic Merch. Banking     3 / 260 = .012   29 / 260 = .112   79 / 260 = .304 232 / 260 = .892 239 / 260 = .919 
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B   55 / 339 = .162   39 / 339 = .115 147 / 339 = .434 261 / 339 = .770 287 / 339 = .847 
Dom. M-B / Wool      0 / 336 = .000     0 / 336 = .000   80 / 336 = .238     0 / 336 = .000   80 / 336 = .238  
Dom. M-B / Silk      0 / 258 = .000     3 / 258 = .012   53 / 258 = .205     0 / 258 = .000   55 / 258 = .213 
International Merch. Bk.   35 / 294 = .119   91 / 294 = .310     0 / 294 = .000     0 / 294 = .000 110 / 294 = .374 
Int’l. M-B / Wool      0 / 359 = .000   27 / 359 = .075     0 / 359 = .000   10 / 359 = .028   36 / 359 = .100 
Int’l. M-B / Silk      0 / 166 = .000     9 / 166 = .054     0 / 166 = .000   13 / 166 = .078   19 / 166 = .114 
 
B. Reciprocal credits 
 (single + multiple) 
Domestic Merch. Banking   63 / 107 = .589     2 / 107 = .019   33 / 107 = .308     0 / 107 = .000   72 / 107 = .673 
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B   49 / 158 = .310   39 / 158 = .247   95 / 158 = .601 130 / 158 = .823 143 / 158 = .905 
Dom. M-B / Wool    15 / 52   = .288     2 / 52   = .038   27 / 52   = .519   50 / 52   = .962   50 / 52   = .962 
Dom. M-B / Silk      0 / 60   = .000     2 / 60   = .033   19 / 60   = .317   52 / 60   = .867   56 / 60   = .933 
International Merch. Bk.   32 / 134 = .239   56 / 134 = .418     0 / 134 = .000   23 / 134 = .172   73 / 134 = .545 
Int’l. M-B / Wool      0 / 41   = .000   17 / 41   = .415     0 / 41   = .000     0 / 41   = .000   17 / 41   = .415 
Int’l. M-B / Silk      0 / 30   = .000     2 / 30   = .067     0 / 30   = .000     2 / 30   = .067     2 / 30   = .067 
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    Partnership-  Family   Neighborhood  Political  All 
    system transfers: embedding:  embedding:  embedding:  together: 
C. Non-reciprocal credits 
 (single + multiple) 
Domestic Merch. Banking     0 / 153 = .000   16 / 153 = .105   46 / 153 = .301 132 / 153 = .863 137 / 153 = .895 
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B     0 / 181 = .000     0 / 181 = .000   52 / 181 = .287 118 / 181 = .652 137 / 181 = .757 
Dom. M-B / Wool      0 / 284 = .000     0 / 284 = .000     0 / 284 = .000     0 / 284 = .000     0 / 284 = .000 
Dom. M-B / Silk      0 / 198 = .000     3 / 198 = .015     0 / 198 = .000     6 / 198 = .030     9 / 198 = .045 
International Merch. Bk.     0 / 160 = .000     0 / 160 = .000     0 / 160 = .000     0 / 160 = .000     0 / 160 = .000 
Int’l. M-B / Wool      0 / 318 = .000     0 / 318 = .000   68 / 318 = .214   10 / 318 = .031   76 / 318 = .239 
Int’l. M-B / Silk      4 / 136 = .029     1 / 136 = .007     0 / 136 = .000   11 / 136 = .081   15 / 136 = .110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B.: “Partnership-system transfers” includes samepart & between_part_sys > 0, when significant.  
 “Family embedding” includes samenuclnp & samefamnn & sameinlaw & sametado > 0, when significant. 
 “Neighborhood embedding” includes samegonf > 0, when significant. 
 “Political embedding” includes cdprior_pct_lt427 & sammedici & samolig > 0, when significant. [Not scrutiny] 
 “All together” includes samepart & between_partsys & samenuclnp & samefamnn & sameinlaw & sametado & samegonf & 
cdprior_pct_lt427 & sammedici & samolig > 0, when significant. 
 
 .000 entries indicate lack of statistical significance, in the first place. 
Figure 1. INPUT-OUTPUT VOLUME OF CREDITS BETWEEN INDUSTRIES: 
shown if [(Observed Credits - Expected Credits) / (Expected Credits)] > .10 
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On-line Appendix: Figure 1. Pajek network visualization of 1427 commercial-credit data 
 
 
 77
Color code for figure 1: 
  
 Blue dots = Silk manufacturing companies 
 Yellow dots = Wool manufacturing companies, San Martino convento (higher quality) 
 Burnt yellow dots = Wool manufacturing companies other conventi (lower quality) 
 Brown dots = Cloth retail (ritagliatori) companies 
 White dots = Cloth dyeing (tintori) companies 
 Red dots = Domestic banks and merchant-banks, resident in Florence 
 Green dots = International Florentine merchant-banks, resident abroad 
 Light green dots = International Florentine merchant companies, resident in Pisa 
  Grey dots = Companies with unclear industrial affiliation 
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On-line Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
A. Among Domestic Merchant-banker companies: 
                        
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
                    (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  5.291*  10.831** [dropped]  
Between systems      .302  1.110***  -.079 
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   4.268*  -1.717  5.182** 
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  1.974**  -2.941  2.148** 
In-law nuclear family    7.693**  8.535**  4.815  
In-law parentado family    -.486  [dropped]   .827  
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone    1.486*** 1.801**  1.075** 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .068   -.956    .353  
 
Social Class:          
Popolani + Magnates     -.288   -.395   -.169  
New men  + New-new men    -.903  -3.042(*)  -.255  
Families not admitted to priorate   -.734  [dropped]  -.283  
 
Political Offices: (% first) 
Priorate (pre-1427)    1.471*** 1.232  1.861*** 
Buonuomini (pre-1427)    -.935*    .023  -1.401* 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)    -.349   -.837    .260 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)     .071    .570   -.455 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)     -.286  1.043  -1.289 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00133  .00202  .00096  
 
Political Factions: 
Medici party (1433)    1.806(*) 1.934    .857  
Albizzi party (1433)    1.063  2.804  -5.591  
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
A. Among Domestic Merchant-banker companies: 
        
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  4.922*** 3.007*** 3.568*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .450    .891*    .362  
Debtor’s accounts seen     .506(*)   .724    .619* 
Creditor partners’ wealth   2.95e-6 -2.88e-6 5.74e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   2.28e-6 3.87e-6 3.18e-6 
 
Constant:     -4.994*** -7.200*** -5.091*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)   2,756   2,756   2,756  
Number of non-zero observations     186      62     124  
Log likelihood     -502.8   -210.6  -419.7 
Wald chi-square      913.1    566.5   317.7  
Number of parameters        24      22      23   
Probability > chi-square     .0000   .0000   .0000  
Pseudo R-squared       .262    .290    .170  
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties      186       62     124    
Number of credits in trading ties     260      107     153  
 
Average number of credits per tie     1.40     1.73     1.23  
Percentage of total credits      100%    41.2%    58.8% 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
B. Among International Merchant-banker companies: (International m-b + Pisa m-b) 
                        
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
                    (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  6.496*** 7.322***  -.258  
Between systems      .123   -.217    .315 
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   3.662**  5.937***   .375 
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  2.721*** 3.526**    .752 
In-law nuclear family     -.940  -1.920   -.571  
In-law parentado family     .322  1.784    .388  
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone      .714    .671    .648 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .100    .255    .002  
 
Social Class:          
Popolani + Magnates     -.010   -.215    .025  
New men  + New-new men   1.764*** 1.996**  1.472*  
Families not admitted to priorate   -.160    .565   -.418  
 
Political Offices: (% first) 
Priorate (pre-1427)    -1.248  -6.409*    .463 
Buonuomini (pre-1427)     .741  5.551*   -.744 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)     .646  -2.007  1.007 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)    -.756  -2.698    .876 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)      .704    .747    .169 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00145  .00494** -.00031  
 
Political Factions: 
Medici party (1433)     -.176  2.499  -1.840  
Albizzi party (1433)     -.191  2.276*  [dropped]  
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
B. Among International Merchant-banker companies: (International m-b + Pisa m-b) 
        
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  4.215*** 3.659*** 2.652*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .810***   .848*    .662**  
Debtor’s accounts seen     .733***   .732(*)   .714** 
Creditor partners’ wealth   0.06e-6 -4.63e-6 1.04e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   -0.75e-6 2.68e-6 -1.45e-6 
 
Constant:     -5.309*** -7.337*** -5.005*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)   4,160   4,160   4,160  
Number of non-zero observations     201      76     125  
Log likelihood      -602.5   -248.2   -484.4 
Wald chi-square      360.6    569.6   174.6  
Number of parameters        24      24      23   
Probability > chi-square     .0000   .0000   .0000  
Pseudo R-squared       .252    .346    .137  
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties      201       76     125    
Number of credits in trading ties     294      134     160  
 
Average number of credits per tie     1.46     1.76     1.28  
Percentage of total credits      100%    45.6%    54.4% 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
C. Between Domestic & International Merchant-banker companies: 
                        
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
                    (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  6.945**  6.881*** -1.216  
Between systems      .199    .277    .255 
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   2.023  3.202**   -.312 
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  1.211(*) 1.075  1.218 
In-law nuclear family    -2.714  -3.654   -.062  
In-law parentado family   1.822*  2.542*    .782  
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone    1.374*** 1.426**  1.232** 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .172    .227    .099  
 
Social Class:          
Popolani + Magnates      .204    .269    .134  
New men  + New-new men    -.378   -.166   -.638  
Families not admitted to priorate    .223    .482   -.012  
 
Political Offices: (% first) 
Priorate (pre-1427)    2.118*** 2.547*  1.796** 
Buonuomini (pre-1427)   -1.169(*)   .239  -1.724* 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)   -1.116  -2.887*   -.284 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)     .054  -1.167    .501 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)      .339   -.138    .551 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00094  .00094  .00117  
 
Political Factions: 
Medici party (1433)    2.305*** 3.793***   .921  
Albizzi party (1433)    1.357   -.722  1.543  
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
C. Between Domestic and International Merchant-banker companies: 
        
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  2.931*** 1.536*** 2.035** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .489*    .928**    .397  
Debtor’s accounts seen     .670**    .560    .832** 
Creditor partners’ wealth   6.94e-6* 11.1e-6** 6.08e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   6.15e-6** 10.6e-6** 5.16e-6* 
 
Constant:     -5.435*** -7.186*** -5.684*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)   5,830   5,830   5,830  
Number of non-zero observations     211      67     144  
Log likelihood      -712.3   -267.2  -584.2 
Wald chi-square      243.1    376.8   139.8  
Number of parameters        24      24      24   
Probability > chi-square     .0000   .0000   .0000  
Pseudo R-squared       .215    .270    .135  
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties      211       67     144    
Number of credits in trading ties     339      158     181  
 
Average number of credits per tie     1.61     2.36     1.26  
Percentage of total credits      100%    46.6%    53.4%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
D. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies: 
             
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  8.340  12.763** 2.800  
Between systems      .220    .208    .254   
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   2.257  -3.144*  3.990  
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)    .083  [dropped]   .863 
In-law nuclear family    8.534  [dropped] 11.754  
In-law parentado family   -4.213  3.739**  -6.332 
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone      .635*  2.266***   .202 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .219  1.332*    .067  
 
Social Class:          
Popolani + Magnates     -.538**  -.568   -.566* 
New men  + New-new men    -.129  -2.476**   .042  
Families not admitted to priorate    .786*   -.591    .890** 
 
Political Offices: (% first)         
Priorate (pre-1427)    1.111  2.684**    .987 
Buonuomini (pre-1427)   -1.185** 1.938*  -1.551*** 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)    -.620  -3.404*   -.314 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)     .610   -.668    .921(*) 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)      .719  1.095    .520 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00165** .00198  .00166**  
 
Political Factions:  
Medici party (1433)    1.123  4.351***  -.944  
Albizzi party (1433)    -4.412  [dropped] -2.593 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
D. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies: 
     
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
                (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  7.525*** 3.137**  6.262*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .528  1.181(*)   .544  
Debtor’s accounts seen     .435**  1.832*    .373*  
Creditor partners’ wealth   5.93e-6* 5.83e-6 6.70e-6** 
Debtor partners’ wealth   2.75e-6 13.2e-6(*) 3.21e-6 
 
Constant:     -5.798*** -11.117*** -5.706*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)  13,037  13,037  13,037  
Number of non-zero observations     294      34     260  
Log likelihood     -1022.8 -160.3   -994.6 
Wald chi-square      431.7    436.6     355.9 
Number of parameters        27      21      24  
Probability > chi-square     .0000   .0000   .0000   
Pseudo R-squared       .272    .321    .220  
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties       294       34     260 
Number of credits in trading ties      336       52     284  
Average number of credits per tie     1.14    1.53    1.09 
Percentage of total credits      100%   15.5%   84.5% 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
E. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies: 
           
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
                    (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  12.242    .875  14.831 
Between systems      .097    .001    .140 
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   6.284  13.902**   .567 
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  -1.133  -2.866  -2.066 
In-law nuclear family    30.999** [dropped] 30.347***  
In-law parentado family   -4.762  [dropped] -2.445  
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone    1.071*** 2.303***   .229 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .390  -1.947**   .714* 
 
Social Class:          
Popolani + Magnates     -.339    .441   -.619* 
New men  + New-new men     .082  -1.406    .207  
Families not admitted to priorate    .550    .065    .728*  
 
Political Offices: (% first)       
Priorate (pre-1427)      .554  2.969***  -.105  
Buonuomini (pre-1427)    -.674    .226   -.861 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)     .442  -1.497  1.158(*) 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)     .319  -2.409*    .432 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)     -.754  -2.219   -.302 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00062  .00027  .00075  
 
Political Factions: 
Medici party (1433)    2.825  [dropped] 4.301(*) 
Albizzi party (1433)    2.544  [dropped] 4.010* 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
E. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies: 
 
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  5.982*** 4.190*** 4.794*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .883**    .566  1.085** 
Debtor’s accounts seen     .515    .983    .515* 
Creditor partners’ wealth   -0.23e-6 7.75e-6 0.43e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   -2.31e-6 9.71e-6(*) -9.17e-6 
 
Constant:     -5.365*** -7.415*** -5.639*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)    4,770    4,770    4,770 
Number of non-zero observations      219       46      173  
Log likelihood      -638.7   -175.6   -575.1  
Wald chi-square      352.6    162.7    243.6 
Number of parameters        24       20       24  
Probability > chi-square     .0000    .0000    .0000   
Pseudo R-squared       .281     .323     .227  
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties       219        46     173 
Number of credits in trading ties      258         60     198 
 
Average number of credits per tie     1.18     1.30    1.14 
Percentage of total credits      100%    23.3%   76.7%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
F. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies: 
             
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  5.361  5.747  5.435  
Between systems      .224    .021    .210   
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   5.534*** 22.105*** -3.981  
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  1.112  14.774*** -2.220 
In-law nuclear family    5.899*  -3.503  7.809  
In-law parentado family   -1.080  5.633**  -2.589 
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone      .770  -10.064*** 1.080** 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .493*  2.013***   .263  
 
Social Class:          
Popolani + Magnates     -.101   -.029   -.080 
New men  + New-new men     .102  1.632    .027  
Families not admitted to priorate   -.327  2.475*   -.856 
 
Political Offices: (% first)         
Priorate (pre-1427)    -1.069    .835  -1.225(*) 
Buonuomini (pre-1427)    -.327  -4.696**   .027 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)    -.566  1.831   -.913 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)     .766  -2.929** 1.074* 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)    1.378*  4.633**  1.129 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00089  .00817*** .00023  
 
Political Factions:  
Medici party (1433)    -2.069  -5.466   -.998  
Albizzi party (1433)    2.905*** [dropped] 3.169*** 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
F. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies: 
     
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
                (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  8.410*** 2.433*** 7.639*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .816*** 1.352*    .755***  
Debtor’s accounts seen   1.094*** 1.233*  1.190***  
Creditor partners’ wealth   0.50e-6 -3.42e-6 1.92e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   -10.0e-6* -1.23e-6 -11.1e-6** 
 
Constant:     -6.611*** -11.912*** -6.445*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)  15,990  15,990  15,990  
Number of non-zero observations     300      30     270  
Log likelihood      -743.5   -126.2   -724.0 
Wald chi-square      983.6    315.9     776.3 
Number of parameters        24      23      24  
Probability > chi-square     .0000   .0000   .0000   
Pseudo R-squared       .501    .422    .471  
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties       300       30     270 
Number of credits in trading ties      359       41     318  
Average number of credits per tie     1.20    1.37    1.18 
Percentage of total credits      100%   11.4%   88.6% 
 90
Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
G. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies: 
           
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
                    (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  6.083  [dropped] 9.182* 
Between systems     -.480   -.795   -.683 
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   12.963  [dropped] 18.013* 
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  3.128**   8.064** 1.502 
In-law nuclear family     -.481  [dropped] 1.353  
In-law parentado family   1.126  2.559**    .718  
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone     -.893  -4.296*   -.474 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .350  -1.684*    .602* 
 
Social Class:          
Popolani + Magnates      .071    .212    .067 
New men  + New-new men     .682*   -.348    .819*  
Families not admitted to priorate    .992*  2.181*    .731  
 
Political Offices: (% first)       
Priorate (pre-1427)     -.546    .729  -1.033  
Buonuomini (pre-1427)     .502  4.707***  -.781 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)   -1.132  -4.686**  -.107 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)   1.059  -2.323  1.826* 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)     -.561  4.194*  -1.855 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00225** .00353  .00213*  
 
Political Factions: 
Medici party (1433)    5.943*** 6.380*  6.084*** 
Albizzi party (1433)    -1.196  [dropped]  -.789 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
G. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies: 
 
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  8.217*** 4.246*** 8.009*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .469    .927    .475 
Debtor’s accounts seen     .601*  1.003    .517 
Creditor partners’ wealth    2.32e-6 5.55e-6 2.17e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   -14.7e-6* 2.73e-6 -17.8e-6** 
 
Constant:     -5.868*** -9.021*** -5.907*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)    5,850    5,850    5,850  
Number of non-zero observations      146       24      122  
Log likelihood      -455.7   -117.7   -396.2  
Wald chi-square      362.1    235.0    339.7 
Number of parameters        24       20       24  
Probability > chi-square     .0000    .0000    .0000   
Pseudo R-squared       .333     .245     .332  
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties       146        24     122 
Number of credits in trading ties      166         30     136 
 
Average number of credits per tie     1.14     1.25    1.12 
Percentage of total credits      100%    18.1%   81.9% 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
H. Among Wool manufacturing companies: 
               
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:            i   
Within system (shared partner)  13.726***       n  14.484*** 
Between systems     -.409        s   -.628 
              u  
Kinship:             f   
Nuclear family (excl. self)   3.288*        f  3.707*  
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  1.952        i  1.342 
In-law nuclear family    2.800        c  2.665  
In-law parentado family     -.792        i   -.473  
             e 
Neighborhood:            n 
Same Gonfalone     -.201        t   -.313 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .191      .273  
               c 
Social Class:               r  
Popolani + Magnates     -.013         e   -.040  
New men  + New-new men     .010         d    .093  
Families not admitted to priorate    .227          i   -.016  
                t 
Political Offices: (% first)             s     
Priorate (pre-1427)      .539      .534  
Buonuomini (pre-1427)     .079      .094 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)    -.276     -.089 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)    -.410     -.567 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)     -.476     -.786  
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  -.00020   -.00050  
          
Political Factions:        
Medici party (1433)     -.206      .187 
Albizzi party (1433)    [dropped]   [dropped]  
 93
Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
H. Among Wool manufacturing companies: 
 
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits  
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  9.881***  i 9.430*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen   1.071***  n 1.007** 
Debtor’s accounts seen     .738**   s   .642* 
Creditor partners’ wealth   2.76e-6  u 3.34e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   2.34e-6  f 2.73e-6 
         f.  
Constant:     -6.195***   -6.027*** 
         c   
         r 
Number of observations (dyads)  15,004   e   15,004 
Number of non-zero observations      204   d      190 
Log likelihood      -827.3   i    -790.6 
Wald chi-square      243.3   t     249.7 
Number of parameters        23   s        23 
Probability > chi-square     .0000        .0000  
Pseudo R-squared       .234         .224 
          
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties        204          14       190 
Number of credits in trading ties       216          14       202 
 
Average number of credits per tie      1.06       1.00      1.06 
Percentage of total credits          100%        6.5%      93.5%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
I. Among Silk manufacturing companies: 
               
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Partnership system:       i    
Within system (shared partner)  [dropped]  n [dropped] 
Between systems    [dropped]  s [dropped] 
         u   
Kinship:        f    
Nuclear family (excl. self)   5.571**   f 5.942**  
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  [dropped]  i [dropped] 
In-law nuclear family    [dropped]  c [dropped]  
In-law parentado family   [dropped]  i [dropped] 
        e  
Neighborhood:       n  
Same Gonfalone      .038   t  -.244 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)   -.648*     -.539  
        c 
Social Class:         r  
Popolani + Magnates     -.709   e  -.514  
New men  + New-new men    -.165   d  -.210  
Families not admitted to priorate   -.703   i  -.576  
         t 
Political Offices: (% first)      s    
Priorate (pre-1427)      .370      .961  
Buonuomini (pre-1427)    -.445     -.516 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)     .682      .600 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)    -.224     -.421 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)    -2.019**   -1.957** 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00057    .00009  
          
Political Factions:        
Medici party (1433)    8.621    8.979 
Albizzi party (1433)      .950    1.357  
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
I. Among Silk manufacturing companies: 
 
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  7.453***  i 7.325*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen     .892*   n   .798 
Debtor’s accounts seen     .405   s   .318 
Creditor partners’ wealth   -9.76e-6  u -6.83e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   -9.92e-6  f -10.7e-6 
         f.  
Constant:     -4.450***   -4.328*** 
         c  
         r  
         e 
         d 
Number of observations (dyads)    1,980     i   1,980  
Number of non-zero observations       146            t      138    
Log likelihood       -383.6  s   -370.5 
Wald chi-square       468.5      332.6 
Number of parameters          19           19  
Probability > chi-square       .0000       .0000 
Pseudo R-squared         .264        .260 
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties         146           8      138  
Number of credits in trading ties        153           8      145  
 
Average number of credits per tie       1.05      1.00     1.05       
Percentage of total credits        100%        5.2%     94.8% 
 96
Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
J. Among Ritagliatori companies: 
               
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single)  
         
Partnership system:       i    
Within system (shared partner)  15.455**  n 9.361 
Between systems      .373   s   .145 
         u  
Kinship:        f   
Nuclear family (excl. self)   5.037(*)  f 1.100  
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)    .251   i 1.037 
In-law nuclear family    6.224*   c [dropped]  
In-law parentado family   2.099   i  -.194 
        e  
Neighborhood:       n  
Same Gonfalone    1.168   t   .140 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .336      .263 
        c 
Social Class:         r  
Popolani + Magnates      .766   e   .950 
New men  + New-new men     .617   d 1.061* 
Families not admitted to priorate  -1.216   i -1.439 
         t 
Political Offices: (% first)      s    
Priorate (pre-1427)     -.327     -.855  
Buonuomini (pre-1427)     .651      .432 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)     .106      .794 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)     .603      .683 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)    -1.260    -2.703  
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  -.00191   -.00156  
         
Political Factions:       
Medici party (1433)    -4.209    -1.427 
Albizzi party (1433)    [dropped]   [dropped]  
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
J. Among Ritagliatori companies: 
 
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  7.141**   i 6.597** 
Creditor’s accounts seen   2.008**   n 1.993** 
Debtor’s accounts seen     .711*   s   .505 
Creditor partners’ wealth   0.10e-6  u 17.1e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   -13.2e-6  f 4.99e-6 
         f.  
Constant:     -6.033***   -6.299*** 
         c 
         r 
         e 
         d 
Number of observations (dyads)    1,190     i   1,190  
Number of non-zero observations         62   t        54 
Log likelihood       -168.0  s   -164.6 
Wald chi-square      2505.3     1211.7 
Number of parameters          23           22 
Probability > chi-square      .0000      .0000 
Pseudo R-squared        .310        .251 
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties          62                    8         54   
Number of credits in trading ties         66                    9                   57   
 
Average number of credits per tie       1.06      1.12    1.06    
Percentage of total credits        100%      13.6%    86.4% 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
K. Between Ritagliatori companies and Wool manufacturing companies: 
              
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single)  
Partnership system:          
Within system (shared partner)  -1.203  [dropped] 4.415 
Between systems      .253   -.327    .320 
         
Kinship:          
Nuclear family (excl. self)   4.384  8.542**   .138  
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  1.865  [dropped] 2.180 
In-law nuclear family    [dropped] [dropped] [dropped]  
In-law parentado family   -12.981 [dropped] -9.552  
 
Neighborhood: 
Same Gonfalone     -.023  -3.233*    .195 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)    .311(*)   .284    .240  
 
Social Class: 
Popolani + Magnates     -.006    .406   -.111  
New men  + New-new men     .179    .349    .241 
Families not admitted to priorate    .032   -.438   -.060  
 
Political Offices: (% first)     
Priorate (pre-1427)      .127   -.222    .249 
Buonuomini (pre-1427)    -.254   -.738   -.240 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)     .265    .353    .313 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)     .049   -.585    .207 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)     -.242  3.301*   -.988 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  .00039  .00357* -.00093  
         
Political Factions: 
Medici party (1433)     -.458  -2.765    .365 
Albizzi party (1433)    [dropped] [dropped] [dropped] 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
K. Between Ritagliatori companies and Wool manufacturing companies: 
 
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  5.997*** 1.563*** 5.268***  
Creditor’s accounts seen     .245  1.241*    .226 
Debtor’s accounts seen     .139  1.073*    .097 
Creditor partners’ wealth   -6.24e-6 14.8e-6 -12.1e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   -0.54e-6 14.0e-6* -4.27e-6 
   
Constant:     -4.010*** -8.707*** -3.744*** 
 
 
Number of observations (dyads)  8,608  8,608  8,608  
Number of non-zero observations     722      66     656  
Log likelihood     -1588.2 -308.4  -1572.6 
Wald chi-square      425.8   215.8   248.3 
Number of parameters        22      19      22 
Probability > chi-square     .0000   .0000   .0000   
Pseudo R-squared       .360    .204    .322 
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties       722         66      656  
Number of credits in trading ties      880         92      788  
 
Average number of credits per tie     1.22      1.39     1.20    
Percentage of total credits      100%     10.5%    89.5% 
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
L. Between Ritagliatori companies and Silk manufacturing companies: 
               
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  +   asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single)  
Partnership system:           
Within system (shared partner)  [dropped] [dropped] [dropped] 
Between systems      .059  [dropped]   .616 
           
Kinship:           
Nuclear family (excl. self)   [dropped] [dropped] [dropped] 
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)  [dropped] [dropped] [dropped] 
In-law nuclear family    3.023  [dropped] 3.909 
In-law parentado family   [dropped] [dropped] [dropped] 
          
Neighborhood:        
Same Gonfalone    -1.124   -.439  -1.287 
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)   -.713  -1.334   -.572 
         
Social Class:           
Popolani + Magnates      .063    .480   -.311 
New men  + New-new men     .391    .131    .511 
Families not admitted to priorate  1.141*   -.778  1.471** 
 
Political Offices: (% first)          
Priorate (pre-1427)      .294   -.013    .528 
Buonuomini (pre-1427)    -.617  -1.800   -.328 
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)     .748  1.425    .587 
Guild consuls (pre-1427)    -.208   -.958   -.025 
Mercanzia (pre-1427)    -2.209*    .193  -3.280* 
 
Scrutiny votes (1433): 
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.  -.00014 -.00158 -.00021 
        
Political Factions:        
Medici party (1433)      .980  [dropped] 2.874 
Albizzi party (1433)    [dropped] [dropped] [dropped]  
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not) 
 
L. Between Ritagliatori companies and Silk manufacturing companies: 
 
Independent     all credit    = reciprocal  + asymmetric 
variables:     relations credits  credits 
          (mult.+single) 
Statistical controls: 
Expected credits, firm size only  7.883*** 3.839*** 7.054*** 
Creditor’s accounts seen   1.573*** 1.163*  1.490** 
Debtor’s accounts seen    -.001    .777   -.035 
Creditor partners’ wealth   5.80e-6 20.9e-6 1.89e-6 
Debtor partners’ wealth   9.74e-6 28.8e-6 -0.44e-6  
           
Constant:     -5.531*** -6.743*** -5.576*** 
     
           
Number of observations (dyads)    3,150    3,150    3,150 
Number of non-zero observations       126        26        100  
Log likelihood       -370.5  -126.0    -317.0 
Wald chi-square       177.2   135.6     163.9 
Number of parameters          19       16        19 
Probability > chi-square      .0000   .0000     .0000 
Pseudo R-squared        .300     .164      .285 
 
N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company 
heterogeneity. 
 
Number of trading ties        126          26        100 
Number of credits in trading ties       141          32        109 
 
Average number of credits per tie      1.12       1.23       1.09    
Percentage of total credits      100%      22.7%       77.3% 
 
 
 
 
